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Abstract
Recently, there have been numerous insightful applications of zero-sum stochastic
differential games in insurance, as discussed in Liu et al. (2014). While there could be
some practical situations under which nonzero-sum game approach is more appropriate,
the development of such approach within actuarial contexts remains rare in the exist-
ing literature. In this article, we study a class of nonzero-sum reinsurance-investment
stochastic differential games between two competitive insurers subject to systematic
risks described by a general compound Poisson risk model. Each insurer can purchase
the excess-of-loss reinsurance to mitigate both systematic and idiosyncratic jump risks
of the inter-arrival claims; and can invest in one risk-free asset and one risky asset
whose price dynamics follows the famous Heston (1993) stochastic volatility model.
The main objective of each insurer is to maximize the expected utility of his terminal
surplus relative to that of his competitor. Dynamic programming principle for this
class of nonzero-sum game problems leads to a non-canonical fixed-point problem of
coupled non-linear integral-typed equations. Despite the complex structure, we estab-
lish the unique existence of the Nash equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategies and
the corresponding value functions of the insurers in a representative example of the
CARA insurers under a mild, time-independent condition. Furthermore, Nash equi-
librium strategies and value functions admit closed forms. Numerical studies are also
provided to illustrate the impact of the systematic risks on the Nash equilibrium strate-
gies. Finally, we connect our results to that under the diffusion-approximated model by
proving explicitly that the Nash equilibrium under the diffusion-approximated model is
an -Nash equilibrium under the general Poisson risk model, thereby establishing that
the analogous Nash equilibrium in Bensoussan et al. (2014) serves as an interesting
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complementary case of the present framework.
Keywords: Nonzero-sum stochastic differential game; Systematic risks; Compound Pois-
son risk model; Excess-of-loss reinsurance; Heston stochastic volatility model; Nash
equilibrium; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation; Fixed-point problems; -Nash
equilibrium
1 Introduction
The seminal works of Gerber (1974) and Bu¨hlmann (1974) have initiated the adoption of
stochastic control techniques to study the optimal reinsurance, investment, and consumption
problems of an insurer maximizing his absolute terminal wealth under different stochastic
environments. Examples include Browne (1995) for establishing the equivalence between the
maximization of the exponential terminal utility and the minimization of the probability of
ruin in the absence of interest rate; Yang and Zhang (2005) for solving the explicit investment
strategies for the case of the jump-diffusion process, and Liu and Ma (2009) for solving the op-
timal reinsurance-investment-consumption problem under a general semi-martingale setting;
and Liu et al. (2013) for solving the optimal investment-reinsurance problem for an insurer
subject to a dynamic risk constraint under a Markovian regime-switching environment.
Yet, insurers often make decisions to best assess his performance against a relative benchmark
of his competitors, resulting in the study of the optimal strategy subject to the relative
performance concerns. In this aspect, Elliott (1976) pioneered the study of the zero-sum
stochastic differential game, in which one player selects a strategy to maximize the value
function whereas the other player minimizes it, by examining the solvability of the zero-sum
stochastic differential game with the establishment of the Isaac condition and its association
to the existence of a saddle point for the game. For the applications of the zero-sum games in
the contexts of the investment and reinsurance problems, see, for example, Browne (2000) on
the stochastic differential investment game between two players; Zeng (2010) on the stochastic
reinsurance game; Elliott and Siu (2011) on the zero-sum game formulation of a portfolio
selection problem subject to the convex risk measure; Liu et al. (2014) on solving the expected
exponential-utility maximization problem of an insurer subject to the worst-case probability
risk by formulating the original maximization problem into a zero-sum stochastic differential
game problem between an insurer and the market.
In reality, however, each insurer has different risk-tolerance, and the study of the relative
performance concern becomes a nonzero-sum game problem. Unlike the case of the zero-
sum games, finding the Nash equilibria in a nonzero-sum game proves to be significantly
challenging as it usually involves finding solutions to the coupled equations. Bensoussan
and Friedman (1977) showed that the Nash equilibrium of a nonzero-sum stopping game be-
tween two players can be reduced to finding a solution of the corresponding quasi-variational
inequality, which admits stationary solution. Bensoussan and Freshe (2000) employed the
dynamic programming principle to show that the existence of the non-stationary Nash equi-
libria in a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game is equivalent to solving the strongly
coupled system of partial differential equations (PDEs). For the applications of the nonzero-
sum games in economics, finance, and insurance, Hamade´ne and Zhang (2009) established
the Nash equilibrium of a nonzero-sum Dynkin game between two players in continuous time
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and adopted the approach to price American game contingent claims, and was later extended
to the multi-player setting in Hamade´ne and Hassani (2014); Bensoussan et al. (2014) for the
establishment of the closed-form Nash equilibrium of the nonzero-sum reinsurance and invest-
ment game between two insurers under the mixed regime-switching framework by means of
the dynamic programming principle; and Espinosa and Touzi (2015) for the adoption of the
stochastic maximum principle to prove the existence of the non-stationary Nash equilibrium
in a N -person game within the Brownian motion framework with deterministic coefficients.
In this paper, we provide the first study on the impact of the systematic risks on a class of
nonzero-sum stochastic differential games subject to systematic risks under a general com-
pound Poisson risk model. We model the surplus process of each of the two insurance compa-
nies as a jump-diffusion process, consisting of an excess-of-loss reinsurance protection and of
an investment in risky and risk-free assets. Each insurance company chooses a reinsurance-
investment strategy pair to maximize his utility of the difference between his terminal surplus
and that of his competitor. Each insurer is exposed to two sources of systematic risks: 1)
claim risks and 2) investment risk. More specifically, each insurer’s surplus process is af-
fected by the systematic as well as idiosyncratic jump risks of inter-arrival claims, whereas
the systematic investment risk is derived from their investment on the same risky asset,
whose dynamics follows the famous Heston (1993) stochastic volatility model. Although the
most closely related work to ours is Bensoussan et al. (2014), the present paper substantially
differs from the aforementioned work in four main aspects.
1. We illustrate the impact of volatility risk of the risky asset on the equilibrium invest-
ment strategies of both insurers. In Bensoussan et al. (2014), the regime-switching
dynamics is independent of the dynamics of the risky asset. The direct consequence of
their result is that the frequency of the regime-switch has no impact on the equilibrium
strategies of both insurers, and hence the volatility (regime-dependent) process is al-
ways inversely proportional to the equilibrium investment strategy of each insurer. In
contrast, we explicitly model the correlation between the risky asset and its volatility
process by adopting the popular Heston (1993) stochastic volatility model, to quantify
the volatility risk to the investment strategies of the insurers when they both invest in
the same risky asset. We show that the sign of the correlation between the volatility and
risky asset processes proves to be pivotal to the directional changes of the investment
strategies of the insurers at equilibrium. In particular, when the correlation between
the risky asset and its volatility process is negative, increasing investment on the risky
asset can hedge against the surging volatility risk, and therefore both insurers would
then choose to increase investment when the volatility risk is high. However, when
the aforementioned correlation is positive, such hedging effect dissipates and therefore
both insures would decrease their investment on the risky assets when exposing to rising
volatility risk.
2. In addition to the consideration of the Cramer-Lundberg diffusion-approximated model,
we model the surplus process of each insurance company based on the compound Pois-
son risk model, which is more realistic as the arrivals of claims are usually modelled
as the Poisson processes. Moreover, we assume that the surplus process of each in-
surer has an idiosyncratic jump risk as well as the systematic jump risk. Instead of
the purchasing the proportional reinsurance protection, as the case in Bensoussan et
al. (2014), we consider the insurers choose to purchase the excess-of-loss reinsurance
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protection, in which they choose the retention level so that any loss in excess of that
level would be covered by the reinsurance company. As discussed in Asmussen et al.
(2000), the excess-of-loss reinsurance protection yields higher profit to the insurers than
the proportional reinsurance protection, and thus are more popular to the insurance
companies. In this respect, our nonzero-sum game model in this article quantifies the
impact of competition to the optimal choice of the retention level of each insurer at
equilibrium. More importantly, we highlight the importance of the systematic jump
risk to the equilibrium reinsurance strategy by considering two extreme cases. In the
case when there is no systematic jump risk, we show that the equilibrium reinsurance
strategy of each insurer coincides with the classical optimal reinsurance strategy when
there is no competition. In other words, the concept of nonzero-sum game is irrelevant
to the insurers in the context of reinsurance when there is no systematic jump risk. On
the other hand, when the intensity of systematic jump risk increases, the equilibrium
reinsurance demand for each insurer decreases, i.e. their corresponding retention levels
at equilibrium increase. As the systematic jump risk affects both insurers, increasing
the purchase of the reinsurance protection would not improve the terminal relative
surplus of each insurer but would rather deteriorate it, and therefore increasing the
coverage of the reinsurance protection cannot be the best response to the strategy of
his competitor. This result highlights the fundamental nature of systematic risk to
the insurers subject to the relative performance concerns. Unlike the standard result
from the optimal strategy subject to the absolute performance concern in which in-
surer would increase the risk-mitigating strategy in face of higher risk, insurers with
the relative performance concern have different strategy for the idiosyncratic and the
systematic risks. As idiosyncratic risk only affects his surplus and not the surplus of
his competitor, an insurer would increase the risk-mitigation strategy to hedge against
such risk. On the other hand, systematic risk affects the wealth of both insurers and
hence each non-cooperative insurer would realize increasing the risk-mitigating measure
on the systematic risk would reduce his relative terminal surplus. Therefore, the best
response of each non-cooperative insurer would then reduce the coverage of the risk-
taking measure in face of surging systematic risk, and our result captures this important
feature.
3. The realistic consideration of the excess-of-loss protection under the general compound
Poisson risk model makes the methodology established in Bensoussan et al. (2014) to
be non-implementable when establishing the Nash equilibrium reinsurance strategies
in this article. Specifically, we use the representative example of two CARA insurers
to show that the existence of the equilibrium excess-of-loss reinsurance strategies be-
comes the solution of the coupled non-linear integral-typed equations, as opposed to the
coupled linear equations in Bensoussan et al. (2014). In other words, the fixed-point
problem in this article proves to be non-trivial, and the solution of which has not been
found in the existing literature. Nonetheless, we show that the equilibrium reinsur-
ance strategies are unique under a mild, time-independent, condition. The condition
is mild because it can be satisfied when the intensity of the systematic jump risk is
small relative to the intensities of the idiosyncratic jump risks of the insurers. This
is in agreement with reality as the insurers would choose reinsurance protection and
investment strategies to diversify their risks so that the magnitude of the systematic
risks would be small relative to the magnitude of the idiosyncratic risks under normal
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circumstances.
4. Finally, to best understand the connection between the compound Poisson risk model
and the diffusion-approximated model under a stochastic differential game framework,
which is the framework first adopted in Bensoussan et al. (2014) for the case of pro-
portional reinsurance, we prove that the stochastic differential game under a com-
pound Poisson risk process encompasses that under the diffusion-approximated process
in the following sense. We first provide the explicit equilibrium excess-of-loss rein-
surance/investment strategies under the diffusion-approximated model. Interestingly
enough, the existence of the Nash equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategies un-
der the diffusion model requires no additional condition, as opposed to the case of
the compound Poisson model. This shows that the high-tractability of the diffusion-
approximated model is maintained in the nonzero-sum game framework. In addition,
we show that the Nash equilibrium under the compound Poisson risk process converges
to that under its diffusion-approximated process; and the condition of existence of the
Nash equilibrium under the compound Poisson model is satisfied asymptotically. More
importantly, we show that the Nash equilibrium strategies, value functions, and the
objective functions under the diffusion-approximated process can be arbitrary close
to that under the compound Poisson under some appropriate technical condition. In
other words, the Nash equilibrium under the diffusion-approximated model is the -
Nash equilibrium, of which the early notion can be found in the classical works such as
Tijs (1981) and the references therein, for the general compound Poisson risk model.
In other words, we provide the first theoretical justification for the adoption of the
diffusion-approximated model in the nonzero-sum game framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model dynamics of the
two competing insurance companies. Section 3 presents the optimal reinsurance-investment
problem subject to the relative performance concern. We show that this problem is equivalent
to the nonzero-sum game between two insurers. Section 4 provides the characterization of
the Nash equilibrium under the general utility function. Section 5 shows that in the case
when both insurers have exponential utilities, the Nash equilibrium exists and admits closed-
form expression under a mild condition. Section 6 has two purposes: 1) we show that
the Nash equilibrium under the CARA insurers exists unconditionally under the diffusion-
approximated framework and that associated Nash equilibrium strategies and value functions
also admit closed-form solutions; 2) we establish the Nash equilibrium under the diffusion-
approximated model is an -Nash equilibrium under the general compound Poisson model and
that the corresponding mild condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium under the general
Poisson model is satisfied asymptotically. Section 7 provides detailed numerical studies to
discuss the impact of competition on the equilibrium strategies. Section 8 concludes the paper
with some suggestions for future research. Appendix A contains the proof of the verification
theorem for the case of two competing CARA insurers.
2 Model formulation
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space. Here, we shall assume that F = (Ft)t≥0, where
Ft , FXt , where the processes {X(t) , (Xpi
n
1
1 (t), X
pin2
2 (t))}t≥0 will be defined subsequently
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below. Denote by ‖f‖∞ the uniform norm of the function f , i.e.
||f ||∞ , sup{|f(x)| : x ∈ D}, for D ⊂ R.
2.1 Surplus process
We begin with the specifications of the surplus processes of two competing insurance com-
panies, having dependent lines of the insurance business. The surplus process of insurer k,
denoted by {Rnk(t)}t≥0, for k = 1, 2, is represented by the classical risk model, i.e.,
dRnk(t) = ckdt− d
C(n)Nk(nat)+N(nat)∑
i=1
Zki
 , k = 1, 2
where ck is the premium rate for k = 1, 2; a ≥ 1 and C is a positive scaling function of
n ∈ N such that C(1) = 1 and limn→∞(C(n))2na exists; and {N1(t)}t≥0, {N2(t)}t≥0 and
{N(t)}t≥0 are three mutually independent Poisson processes with intensities λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0,
and λ > 0, respectively.1 The surplus process {Rnk(t)}t≥0 in (1) indicates that each insurer
is subject to a common systematic insurance risk, represented as N(t), in addition to his
idiosyncratic insurance risk, represented as Nk(t), for k = 1, 2, at any time t > 0. The claim
sizes {Zki , i = 1, 2, ...}, k = 1, 2 are independent and identically distributed positive random
variables with common distribution Fk(z), and we shall hereafter use Z
k as the claim size
facec by insurer k, for k = 1, 2, in place of Zki for more transparent presentation. Let
Dk , sup{z : Fk(z) ≤ 1} and suppose that Fk(0) = 0, 0 < Fk(z) < 1, for 0 < z < Dk, and
Fk(z) = 1 for z ≥ Dk. Denote by µ¯k , E
[
Zki
]
. In addition, we assume that {Z1i , i = 1, 2, ...}
and {Z2i , i = 1, 2, ...} are mutually independent and that both of them are independent of
{Nk(t)}t≥0, for k = 1, 2 and {N(t)}t≥0. Suppose also that the premium is calculated according
to the expected value principle, i.e., ck = (C(n)n
a + ηk)(λk + λ)µ¯k, where ηk > 0 is the safety
loading of insurer k, for k = 1, 2, used to cover his own costs of operations. With these
notations, the surplus process {Rnk(t)}t≥0, for k = 1, 2, can be rewritten as
dRnk(t) = ηk(λk + λ)µ¯kdt− d
(
C(n)
[
(Nk(n
at) +N(nat))Zk − na(λk + λ)µ¯kt
])
. (1)
Remark 2.1. Note that the limit process of {Rnk(t)}t≥0, i.e. limn→∞{Rnk(t)}t≥0, is well-
defined by the virtue of the martingale central limit theorem (see, for example, Theorem 1.4
of Chapter 7 in Ethier and Kurtz (1986)). Same remarks apply to the processes {Rankk (t)}t≥0
in (2) and {Xpinkk (t)}t≥0 in (4).
2.2 Reinsurance and investment opportunities
Suppose that each insurer can mitigate his insurance risks with a purchase of an excess-of-
loss reinsurance protection. More precisely, let {ank(t)}t≥0 be a F -progressively measurable
process representing a (fixed) excess-of-loss retention level for insurer k, for k = 1, 2. Note
that under the assumption on Fk, E
[
(Zki )
2
]
<∞ and hence we have ank ∈ L2(R), for k = 1, 2.
1The same result applies if the claim size distributions are different for the idiosyncratic {Nk(t)}t≥0, for
k = 1, 2, and systematic {N(t)}t≥0 shocks.
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Let Ak , {ank(t) ∈ L2(R), t ≥ 0} be the set of excess-of-loss retention levels of insurer k. The
corresponding surplus process with the reinsurance protection, denoted by {Rankk (t)}t≥0, for
k = 1, 2, then becomes
dR
ank
k (t) = (λk + λ) [θkµk(a
n
k) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k] dt
−d (C(n) [(Nk(nat) +N(nat)) (Zk ∧ ank)− (λk + λ)naµk(ank)t]), (2)
where x ∧ y , min(x, y), µk(ank) = E
[
(Zk ∧ ank)
]
=
∫ ank
0
F k(x)dx, for F k(x) , 1− Fk(x), and
θk denotes the safety loading of the reinsurer for insurer k. As it is more common in practice
that the reinsurer requests higher safety loading from the insurers, we shall hereafter assume
that θk > ηk, for k = 1, 2, namely non-cheap reinsurance protection. From the reinsurance-
protected surplus process of insurer k, {Rankk (t)}t≥0, in (2), insurer k selects the retention level
ak such that he only needs to pay all claims up to the fixed amount a
n
k, while all in excess of
ak will be covered by the reinsurance company.
In addition to purchasing the reinsurance protection, the insurer can invest in a stock market.
More specifically, assume that each insurer can invest in a risk-free asset,and a risky asset.
The price process of the risk-free asset is given by
dS0(t) = rS0(t)dt,
where r > 0 is the risk-free interest rate. To capture the impact of the volatility risk to
the insurers’ strategies, we model the price process of the risky asset by the Heston (1993)
stochastic volatility model, i.e.{
dS(t) = S(t)
[
(r +mL(t))dt+
√
L(t)dBS(t)
]
, S(0) = s0,
dL(t) = α(δ − L(t))dt+ σ√L(t)dBL(t), L(0) = l0, (3)
where m,α, δ and σ are all positive constants, {BS(t)}t≥0 and {BL(t)}t≥0 are two standard
Brownian motions with E[BS(t)BL(t)] = ρSt. Moreover, we require that 2αδ ≥ σ2 (see Cox
et al. (1985)).
Let {bnk(t)}t≥0 be the F -progressively measurable process representing the money amount
that insurer k invests in the risky asset S, for k = 1, 2. Define Bk , {bnk(t), t ≥ 0} as the
set of investment amounts of insurer k. A reinsurance-investment strategy of insurer k is
then denoted as {pink(t)}t≥0 , {(ank(t), bnk(t))}t≥0 ∈ Ak × Bk. Corresponding to a reinsurance-
investment strategy pink(t), the surplus process of insurer k, denoted by {Xpi
n
k
k (t)}t≥0, for
k = 1, 2, takes the form
dX
pink
k (t) =
{
(λk + λ) [θkµk(a
n
k) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k] + rXpi
n
k
k (t) +mb
n
k(t)L(t)
}
dt
+bnk(t)
√
L(t)dBS(t)− C(n)d
[
(Nk(n
at) +N(nat)) (Zk ∧ ank)
−(λk + λ)naµk(ank)t
]
X
pink
k (0) = xk.
(4)
We denote by Πk , Ak × Bk ⊂ Ak × Bk the set of convex strategies pink = (ank, bnk) ∈ Πk
of insurer k ∈ {1, 2} satisfying condition that ank ∈ L2(R) and E
[∫ T
0
(bnk(t))
4L2(t)dt
]
<∞,
for all T < ∞. We shall refer a strategy pink ∈ Πk to be an admissible strategy. From the
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standard theory of Le´vy processes, (see, for example, Sato (1999)), it is clear that for all
pink = (a
n
k, b
n
k) ∈ Πk, and for any initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, the stochastic differential
equation {Xpinkk (t)}t≥0 in (4) admits a unique strong solution. In this case, for each n ∈ N,
Doob’s Lp-inequality also gives
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|Xpinkk (t)|2
]
<∞, for k = 1, 2. (5)
3 Optimal strategy subject to the relative performance
concerns
Suppose that insurer k, for k = 1, 2 has a utility function Uk which is strictly concave and
continuously differentiable on (−∞,∞). The optimization problem of each insurer is to
optimally choose a reinsurance-investment strategy, pink ∈ Πk, for k = 1, 2, that maximizes
the expected utility of his relative performance against that of his competitor at the terminal
time T . More precisely, we have
Problem 3.1. The optimal reinsurance and investment problem subject to relative perfor-
mance concern between two insurance companies under the expected utility framework is a
coupled stochastic optimization problem such that:
Given the strategy of his competitor j ∈ {1, 2}, i.e. pinj = (anj , bnj), the objective function,
denote as Jnk (t, xk, xj, pi
n
k(t), pi
n
j (t)), of insurer k 6= j is to find an optimal strategy pˆink , (aˆnk, bˆnk)
such that
max
pink=(a
n
k,b
n
k)∈Πk
Jnk (t, xk, xj, pi
n
k(t), pi
n
j(t)) = J
n
k (t, xk, xj, pˆi
n
k(t), pi
n
j (t)),
where
Jnk (t, xk, xj, pi
n
k(t), pi
n
j (t))
, E
[
Uk
(
(1− κk)Xpi
n
k
k (T ) + κk(X
pink
k (T )−X
pinj
j (T ))
)
|Xpinkk (t)− κkX
pinj
j (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
= E
[
Uk
(
X
pink
k (T )− κkX
pinj
j (T )
)
|Xpinkk (t)− κkX
pinj
j (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
. (6)
The parameter κk ∈ [0, 1] in (6), for k = 1, 2, can be interpreted as the sensitivity parameter
of insurer k to his/her competitor’s performance. As different insurer generally has differ-
ent perception on the degree of influence of their competitor’s surplus on his strategy, i.e.
κ1 6= κ2, Problem 3.1 is a typical example of the nonzero-sum games between two insurers.
Consequently, the solution to Problem 3.1 is the Nash equilibrium of the nonzero-sum game
between two insurers, where the Nash equilibrium is the strategy pi∗,nk , (a
∗,n
k , b
∗,n
k ) ∈ Πk such
that, for all pˆin1 , (aˆn1, bˆn1) and pˆin2 , (aˆn2, bˆn2),{
Jn1 (t, x1, x2, pˆi
n
1(t), pi
∗,n
2 (t)) ≤ Jn1 (t, x1, x2, pi∗,n1 (t), pi∗,n2 (t)),
Jn2 (t, x2, x1, pˆi
n
2(t), pi
∗,n
1 (t)) ≤ Jn2 (t, x2, x1, pi∗,n2 (t), pi∗,n1 (t)).
(7)
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4 Nash equilibrium for insurers in compound Poisson
risk model: General case
In this section, we solve for the Nash equilibrium of Problem 3.1 via the dynamic programming
principle. To this end, denote by Xˆ
pink
k (t) , X
pink
k (t)− κkX
pinj
j (t) the relative surplus process of
insurer k, for k = 1, 2, hence it follows that
dXˆ
pink
k (t) =
{
rXˆ
pink
k (t) + (λk + λ)[θkµk(a
n
k(t))
+(ηk − θk)µ¯k]− κk(λj + λ)[θjµ(anj(t)) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
+m[bnk(t)− κkbnj(t)]L(t)
}
dt+ [bnk(t)− κkbnj(t)]
√
L(t)dBS(t)
−C(n)d [(Nk(nat) +N(nat)) (Zk ∧ ank)− (λk + λ)naµk(ank(t))t]
+κkC(n)d
[
(Nj(n
at) +N(nat)) (Zj ∧ anj)− (λj + λ)naµj(anj(t))t
]
,
Xˆ
pink
k (0) = xˆk,
(8)
where k 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. Define V k,n(t, x, l), for k = 1, 2, to be the value function as follows,
V k,n(t, x, l) , sup
pink∈Πk
E
[
Uk(Xˆ
pink
k (T )|Xˆpi
n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
, (9)
for k, j = 1, 2 with k 6= j. In addition, let Γ = [0, T )× R× R+ and Γ = [0, T ]× R× R+; for
W k,n ∈ C 1,2(Γ) ∩ C 0(Γ), where k 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, denote Lpink to be the infinitesimal generator
of Xˆ
pink
k with an admissible strategy of insurer k, pi
n
k ∈ Πk.
LpinkW k,n(t, x, l) ,
{
rx+ (λk + λ)
[
(naC(n) + θk)µk(a
n
k) + µ¯
k(ηk − θk)
]
−κk(λj + λ)
[
(naC(n) + θj)µj(a
∗,n
j ) + µ¯
j(ηj − θj)
]
+ml
[
bnk(t)− κkb∗,nj (t)
]}
W k,nx (t, x, l)
+
l
2
[
(bnk(t))
2 + κ2k(b
∗,n
j (t))
2 − 2κkbnk(t)b∗,nj (t)
]
W k,nxx (t, x, l)
+α(δ − l)W k,nl (t, x, l) +
1
2
σ2lW k,nll (t, x, l)
+ρSσl
[
bnk(t)− κkb∗,nj (t)
]
W k,nxl (t, x, l)
+naλkE
[
W k,n
(
t, x− C(n)(Zk ∧ ank(t))
)−W k,n(t, x, l)]
+naλjE
[
W k,n
(
t, x+ κkC(n)(Z
j ∧ a∗,nj (t))
)−W k,n(t, x, l)]
+naλE
[
W k,n
(
t, x− C(n)(Zk ∧ ank(t)) + κkC(n)(Zj ∧ a∗,nj (t))
)
−W k,n(t, x, l)] . (10)
Analogous to Kraft (2005), Taskar and Zeng (2013), and Zhao et al. (2013), we begin with
the following verification theorem.
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Theorem 4.1. Let W k,n ∈ C 1,2(Γ) ∩ C 0(Γ), for k = 1, 2, be the solution of the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation{
0 = W k,nt (t, x, l) + suppink∈Πk Lpi
n
kW k,n(t, x, l), for 0 ≤ t < T,
W k,n(T, x, l) = Uk(x).
(11)
For the relative surplus process Xˆ
pink
k associated with an admissible strategy pi
n
k ∈ Πk = Ak×Bk,
we have
E
[
Uk(Xˆ
pink
k (T ))|Xˆpi
n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
≤ W k,n(t, x, l). (12)
Denote pi∗k = (a
∗,n
k , b
∗,n
k ), where a
∗,n
k ∈ Ak, b∗,nk ∈ Bk are given as follows
a∗,nk (t) , arg max
ank∈Ak
{
(λk + λ)(n
aC(n) + θk)µk(a
n
k(t))W
k,n
x (t, x, l) + λkn
aE
[
W k,n(t, x
−(Zk ∧ ank(t)), l)−W k,n(t, x, l)
]
+λnaE
[
W k,n(t, x− C(n)(Zk ∧ ank(t))
+κkC(n)(Z
j ∧ a∗,nj (t)), l)−W k,n(t, x, l)
] }
, (13)
b∗,nk (t) , arg max
bnk∈Bk
{
mlbnk(t)W
k,n
x (t, x, l) +
l
2
[
(bnk(t))
2 − 2κkbnk(t)b∗,nj (t)
]
W k,nxx (t, x, l)
+ρSσlb
n
k(t)W
k,n
xl (t, x, l)
}
, (14)
and let Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k be the corresponding relative surplus process of insurer k. If for all sequences of
stopping times {τi}i∈N, the sequence
{
W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi∗,nk (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)}
i∈N
is uniformly
integrable, then we have
V k,n(t, x, l) = E
[
Uk(Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (T ))|Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
= W k,n(t, x, l). (15)
In view of Theorem 4.1, the Nash equilibrium in (40) can now be formulated in terms the
partial differential equations (PDEs). More specifically, we have
Theorem 4.2. Let xˆk = xk − κkxj, for k, j ∈ {1, 2} with k 6= j. The Nash equilibrium
strategy for insurer k, for k = 1, 2, of Problem 3.1 is pi∗,nk = (a
∗,n
k , b
∗,n
k ), where a
∗,n
k , b
∗,n
k admit
the forms in (13) and (14), respectively; and the corresponding equilibrium value function is
the solution to the following system of coupled PDEs:{
0 = W 1,nt (t, xˆ1, l) + Lpi
∗,n
1 W 1,n(t, xˆ1, l),
0 = W 2,nt (t, xˆ2, l) + Lpi
∗,n
2 W 2,n(t, xˆ2, l),
(16)
with the terminal conditions {
W 1,n(T, xˆ1, l) = U
1(xˆ1),
W 2,n(T, xˆ2, l) = U
2(xˆ2).
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Due to the strongly coupling feature, the existence of solution to the PDE system in (16)
is difficult to establish in general, as it is closely related to the regularity conditions of the
system, see Bensoussan and Freshe (2000) for details. Since the compound Poisson risk
process in (4) possesses finite number of jumps with all finite moments on any compact time
interval [0, T ], together with some implied scaling structures, we can follow similar ideas as
in the proof of the famous Cauchy–Kowalevski Theorem via the use of formal power series
expansion and analytic majorization, to especially deal with the expectation terms in (16),
and to establish the existence of its solution for very small T . Nonetheless, we show that for
the representative case of the exponential utility function, we can establish uniquely existence
of the solution to the system (16).
5 Nash equilibrium for insurers in compound Poisson
risk model: Case of CARA insurers
For the rest of the paper, we shall focus on a representative case in which both insurers have
constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) preferences, i.e.
Uk(x) = − 1
qk
e−qkx, (17)
with qk > 0, k = 1, 2. Denote
hnk(a) , −
∫ a
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy, (18)
for k 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. The following theorem provides the closed-form expressions for the Nash
equilibrium between two CARA insurers.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that κ1κ2 < 1, and suppose that insurer k, for k = 1, 2 has an
exponential utility function (17) and the relative surplus process {Xˆpinkk (t)}t≥0 in (8). Then,
for each n ∈ N and a ≥ 1, the solution to the coupled PDE system in (16) is V k,n(t, x, l), for
k = 1, 2, which admits the following explicit form:
V k,n(t, x, l) = − 1
qk
exp
{−qk [xer(T−t) + fk,n(t)]− A(t)l −B(t)} , (19)
where
fk,n(t) =
[
(λk + λ)(ηk − θk)
r
µ¯k − κk(λj + λ)(ηj − θj)
r
µ¯j
] [
1− er(T−t)]
−(λk + λ)(naC(n) + θk)
∫ T
t
er(T−s)µk(a
∗,n
k (s))ds
+κk(λj + λ)(n
aC(n) + θj)
∫ T
t
er(T−s)µj(a
∗,n
j (s))ds
+(λk + λ)n
a
∫ T
t
∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
C(n)er(T−s)eqkC(n)ye
r(T−s)
F k(y)dyds
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−(λj + λ)na
∫ T
t
∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
κkC(n)e
r(T−s)e−κkqkC(n)ye
r(T−s)
F j(y)dyds
−λna
∫ T
t
[∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
C(n)er(T−s)eqkC(n)ye
r(T−s)
F k(y)dy
]
·
[∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
κkqkC(n)e
r(T−s)e−κkqkC(n)ye
r(T−s)
F j(y)dy
]
ds, (20)
A(t) =

v+v−−v+v−e−
1
2 (1−ρ
2
S)σ
2(v+−v−)(T−t)
v−−v+e−
1
2 (1−ρ2S)σ2(v+−v−)(T−t)
, ρS 6= ±1,
m2
2(α+mσ)
[
1− e−(α+mσ)(T−t)] , ρS = 1,
m2
2(α−mσ)
[
1− e−(α−mσ)(T−t)] , ρS = −1, and α 6= mσ,
m2
2
(T − t), ρS = −1, and α = mσ,
(21)
B(t) = αδ
∫ T
t
A(s)ds, (22)
with
v+,− =
−α− ρSσm±
√
α2 + 2αρSσm+ σ2m2
(1− ρ2S)σ2
.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , let (aˆn1, aˆn2), if exists, be the unique solution of the following system
aˆn1(t) =
e−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
ln
{
(λ1+λ)(1+ θ1naC(n))
λ1+λ(1+hn1(aˆn2(t)))
}
,
aˆn2(t) =
e−r(T−t)
q2C(n)
ln
{
(λ2+λ)(1+ θ2naC(n))
λ2+λ(1+hn2(aˆn1(t)))
} (23)
then the reinsurance retention levels (a∗,n1 , a
∗,n
2 ) at equilibrium admit one of the following
forms, for k 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
1. If aˆnk(t) ≤ Dk and aˆnj(t) ≤ Dj, then (a∗,nk (t), a∗,nj (t)) = (aˆnk(t), aˆnj(t));
2. If aˆnk(t) > Dk and aˆ
n
j(t) ≤ Dj, then (a∗,nk (t), a∗,nj (t)) =
(
Dk,
e−r(T−t)
qjC(n)
ln
{
(λj+λ)
(
1+
θj
naC(n)
)
λj+λ(1+hnj (Dk))
}
∧Dj
)
;
3. If aˆnk(t) > Dk and aˆ
n
j(t) > Dj, then (a
∗,n
k (t), a
∗,n
j (t)) = (Dk, Dj);
and the investment amount (b∗,n1 , b
∗,n
2 ) at equilibrium is
b∗,n1 (t) =
e−r(T−t)
1−κ1κ2
[(
1
q1
+ κ1
q2
)
(m− ρSσA(t))
]
,
b∗,n2 (t) =
e−r(T−t)
1−κ1κ2
[(
1
q2
+ κ2
q1
)
(m− ρSσA(t))
]
.
(24)
Remark 5.2. A sufficient condition under which the equilibrium reinsurance strategies (aˆn1, aˆ
n
2)
uniquely exist is given in Lemma 5.4.
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Proof. For the sake of transparent exposition, we shall suppress the arguments of the func-
tions. Consider the following Ansatz:
W k,n(t, x, l) , − 1
qk
exp
{−qk [xer(T−t) + fk,n(t) + gk(t, l)]} , (25)
with fk(T ) = 0, gk(T, l) = 0, for all l ∈ R. We shall verify that V k,n = W k,n in Appendix A.
Since we have the following expressions:
(1) W k,nt = (rqkxe
r(T−t)−qkfk,nt −qkgkt )W k,n, W k,nx = −qker(T−t)W k,n, W k,nxx = q2ke2r(T−t)W k,n,
(2) W k,nl = −qkgklW k,n, W k,nll = −qkgkllW k,n+q2k(gkl )2W k,n, W k,nxl = q2ker(T−t)gklW k,n,
(3) E
[
W k,n(t, x− C(n)(Zk ∧ ak(t)), l)−W k,n(t, x, l)
]
=
{∫ ank(t)
0
qke
r(T−t)C(n)eqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF k(y)dy
}
W k,n,
(4) E
[
W k,n(t, x+ κkC(n)(Z
j ∧ aˆnj(t)), l)−W k,n(t, x, l)
]
= −
{∫ a∗,nj (t)
0 qkκke
r(T−t)C(n)e−qkκke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy
}
W k,n,
(5) E
[
W k,n(t, x− C(n)(Zk ∧ ank(t)) + κkC(n)(Zj ∧ aˆnj(t)), l)−W k,n(t, x, l)
]
=
{[∫ ank(t)
0
qke
r(T−t)C(n)eqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF k(y)dy + 1
]
·
[
1− ∫ aˆnj (t)0 κkqker(T−t)C(n)e−κkqker(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy]− 1
}
W k,n,
for k, j = 1, 2, with k 6= j, it implies that2 minimizer ank(t) in (13) satisfies
0 = −(λk + λ)(θk + naC(n))F k(ank)qker(T−t)W k,n(t, x, l)
+naλkqke
r(T−t)C(n) exp
(
qke
r(T−t)C(n)ank
)
F k(a
n
k)W
k,n(t, x, l)
+naλqke
r(T−t)C(n) exp
(
qke
r(T−t)C(n)ank
)
F k(a
n
k)
[
1 + hnk(aˆ
n
j)
]
W k,n(t, x, l)
= −(λk + λ)(θk + naC(n)) + naC(n)λkexp
(
qke
r(T−t)C(n)ank
)
+naC(n)λexp
(
qke
r(T−t)C(n)ank
) [
1 + hnk(aˆ
n
j)
]
,
i.e.
aˆnk =
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
ln
 (λk + λ)
(
1 + θk
C(n)na
)
(
λk + λ
[
1 + hnk(aˆ
n
j)
])
 . (26)
2To be more rigorous, we can first assume that ak ∈ [0, Dk), where Dk , sup{z : Fk(z) < 1} < ∞.
Then, the possibility that F k(ak) = 0 can then be excluded and that (26) remains in force for a
n
k ∈ [0, Dk).
Following this argument, we then arrive with Lemma 5.3 that, for each n ∈ N and a ≥ 1, aˆnk is uniformly
bounded, in which the upper bound is independent of Dk. As the upper bound of aˆ
n
k is independent of Dk,
Lemma 5.3 remains valid, and therefore the existence of equilibrium reinsurance strategies aˆnk, for k = 1, 2,
are guaranteed by Lemma 5.4, even when we let Dk approach to ∞.
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The unique existence of the reinsurance pair (aˆn1, aˆ
n
2) is equivalent to the existence of solution
to non-linear integral-typed system in (23), which will be established in Lemma 5.4; in accor-
dance of this result, the desired existence of the equilibrium reinsurance strategies (a∗,n1 , a
∗,n
2 )
follows.
On other hand, the minimizer b∗,nk in (14) is
b∗,nk (t) =
m
qk
e−r(T−t) + κkb
∗,n
j (t)− ρSσe−r(T−t)gkl , (27)
yielding (24), where A(t) shall be determined below.
Applying (11) to W k,n in (25) with (26), and (27) yields
0 = fk,nt + g
k
t + (λk + λ)e
r(T−t) [(C(n)na + θk)µk(a
∗,n
k (t)) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]
−κk(λj + λ)er(T−t)
[
(C(n)na + θj)µj(a
∗,n
j (t)) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j
]
+
m2l
2qk
+
1
2
ρ2Sσ
2qkl(g
k
l )
2
+α(δ − l)gkl −
1
2
σ2qkl(g
k
l )
2 − ρSσmlgkl +
1
2
σ2lgkll
−(λk + λ)na
∫ a∗k(t)
0
er(T−t)C(n)eqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF k(y)dy
+(λj + λ)n
a
∫ a∗,nj (t)
0
κke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy
+λna
[∫ a∗,nk (t)
0
er(T−t)C(n)eqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF k(y)dy
]
·
[∫ a∗,nj (t)
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy
]
,
for j = 1, 2 with j 6= k, which can be decomposed into two equations
0 = gkt +
m2l
2qk
− 1
2
(1− ρ2S)σ2qkl(gkl )2 + αδgkl − (α + ρSσm)lgkl +
1
2
σ2lgkll, (28)
and
0 = fk,nt + (λk + λ)e
r(T−t) [(C(n)na + θk)µk(a
∗,n
k (t)) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]
−κk(λj + λ)er(T−t)
[
(C(n)na + θj)µj(a
∗,n
j (t)) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j
]
−(λk + λ)na
∫ a∗,nk (t)
0
er(T−t)C(n)eqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF k(y)dy
+(λj + λ)n
a
∫ a∗,nj (t)
0
κke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy
+λna
[∫ a∗,nk (t)
0
er(T−t)C(n)eqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF k(y)dy
]
·
[∫ a∗,nj (t)
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy
]
. (29)
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To solve (28), we assume that gk(t, l) admits the following affine form:
gk(t, l) =
1
qk
(A(t)l +B(t)) ,
when substituting A and B into (28), we have
Atl +Bt +
m2l
2
− 1
2
(1− ρ2S)σ2l(A(t))2 + α(δ − l)A(t)− ρSσmlA(t) = 0.
Matching coefficients yields{
At − 12(1− ρ2S)σ2(A(t))2 − (α + ρSσm)A(t) + m
2
2
= 0,
A(T ) = 0.
(30)
and {
Bt + αδA(t) = 0,
B(T ) = 0.
in which the solutions, A and B, admit the forms in (21) and (22), respectively.
Finally, from (29), it is clear that fk,n is a solution of the linear ordinary differential equations,
which admits the form in (20).
We now proceed on proving the existence of the solution to the system in (23). First, we
show that aˆnk(t), k = 1, 2 is uniformly bounded, for t ∈ [0, T ], in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Let aˆnk(t) defined in (23), for k = 1, 2. Then, for each n ∈ N and a ≥ 1,
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
ln
(
1 +
θk
C(n)na
)
≤ aˆnk(t) ≤
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
ln
[
λk + λ
λk
(
1 +
θk
C(n)na
)]
.
Proof. Note that
∂hnk
∂aˆnj
= −κkqker(T−t)C(n)e−κkqker(T−t)C(n)aˆnj (t) F j(aˆnj(t)) < 0.
Thus hk(aˆ
n
j) decreases in aˆ
n
j , and hence
−
∫ +∞
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy ≤ hnk(aˆnj) ≤ 0.
Furthermore, 0 ≤ Fj(y) ≤ 1 leads to
−
∫ +∞
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy ≥ −
∫ +∞
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)ydy = −1.
Hence −1 ≤ hnk(aˆnj) ≤ 0. Then it follows that
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
ln
(
1 +
θk
C(n)na
)
≤ aˆnk(t) ≤
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
ln
[
λk + λ
λk
(
1 +
θk
C(n)na
)]
immediately.
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Next lemma provides the sufficient condition for the unique existence of the couple system
of non-linear integral-typed equations in (23).
Lemma 5.4. If
κ1κ2
λ(λ1 + λ)
(
1 + θ1
C(n)na
)
λ21
λ(λ2 + λ)
(
1 + θ2
C(n)na
)
λ22
 < 1, (31)
the coupled system of non-linear integral-typed equations (23) admits a unique solution (aˆn1, aˆ
n
2),
where aˆn1 and aˆ
n
2 ∈ C[0, T ].
Remark 5.5. Note that condition (31) is rather mild as it is satisfied when the intensity of
the systematic jump risk λ is small relative to the intensities of the idiosyncratic jump risks
λk, for k = 1, 2. This is in line with reality as insurers choose their reinsurance-investment
strategies to diversify their risks, and therefore the magnitude of the systematic risk in their
surpluses should be small relative to their idiosyncratic risks.
Proof. Consider the following sequence {aˆnk,l}∞l=0, for k = 1, 2, where
aˆn1,0(t) , e
−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
ln
{
1 + θk
C(n)na
}
,
aˆn2,0(t) , e
−r(T−t)
q2C(n)
ln
{
1
An2+B
n
2[h
n
2(aˆ
n
1,0(t))+1]
}
aˆn1,l(t) , e
−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
ln
{
1
An1+B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l−1(t))+1]
}
, for l ≥ 1,
aˆn2,l(t) , e
−r(T−t)
q2C(n)
ln
{
1
An2+B
n
2[h
n
2(aˆ
n
1,l(t))+1]
}
, for l ≥ 1,
(32)
where
Ank ,
λk
(λk + λ)
(
1 + θk
C(n)na
) , Bnk , λ
(λk + λ)
(
1 + θk
C(n)na
) , (33)
for k = 1, 2. It suffices to show that {aˆnk,l}∞l=0 is a Cauchy sequence with respect to the
uniform norm.
Firstly, the uniform boundedness of the sequence {aˆn1,l} is established via Lemma 5.3, which
readily implies that, for each n ∈ N and a ≥ 1,
0 < Ank ≤ Ank +Bnk[hnk(aˆnj,l(t)) + 1] ≤ Ank +Bnk =
1
1 + θk
C(n)na
< 1, (34)
and so by definition,
1
qkC(n)
ln
(
1 +
θk
C(n)na
)
≤ aˆnk,l(t) ≤
1
qkC(n)
ln
[
λk + λ
λk
(
1 +
θk
C(n)na
)]
, (35)
for all k = 1, 2, l ∈ N, and t ∈ [0, T ].
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Note that
|aˆn1,l+1(t)− aˆn1,l(t)| ≤
e−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
∣∣∣∣∣ ln
{
1
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l(t)) + 1]
}
− ln
{
1
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l−1(t)) + 1]
}∣∣∣∣∣
≤ e
−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1An1 +Bn1[hn1(aˆn2,l(t)) + 1] − 1An1 +Bn1[hn1(aˆn2,l−1(t)) + 1]
∣∣∣∣∣
=
e−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
Bn1
∣∣∣hn1(aˆn2,l(t))− hn1(aˆn2,l−1(t))∣∣∣[
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l(t)) + 1]
][
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l−1(t)) + 1]
]
=
e−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
Bn1[
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l(t)) + 1]
][
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l−1(t)) + 1]
]
·
∣∣∣ ∫ aˆn2,l(t)
aˆn2,l−1(t)
C(n)κ1q1e
r(T−t)e−κ1q1e
−r(T−t)C(n)yF 2(y)dy
∣∣∣
≤ e
−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
Bn1[
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l(t)) + 1]
][
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l−1(t)) + 1]
]
·
∣∣∣e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)aˆn2,l(t) − e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)aˆn2,l−1(t)∣∣∣
=
e−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
Bn1[
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l(t)) + 1]
][
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l−1(t)) + 1]
]
·
∣∣∣κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)an0∣∣∣∣∣∣aˆn2,l(t)− aˆn2,l−1(t)∣∣∣
=
κ1B
n
1[
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l(t)) + 1]
][
An1 +B
n
1[h
n
1(aˆ
n
2,l−1(t)) + 1]
]∣∣∣aˆn2,l(t)− aˆn2,l−1(t)∣∣∣
≤ κ1B
n
1
(An1)
2
∣∣∣aˆn2,l(t)− aˆn2,l−1(t)∣∣∣ = κ1λ(λ1 + λ)
(
1 + θ1
C(n)na
)
λ21
∣∣∣aˆn2,l(t)− aˆn2,l−1(t)∣∣∣,
where the second inequality follows from (34); the fourth equality follows from the definition
of hnk in (18), for k = 1, 2; the sixth equality follows from the mean-value theorem that there
exists an0 ∈ [aˆn2,l−1(t), aˆn2,l(t)] such that∣∣∣e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)aˆn2,l(t) − e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)aˆn2,l−1(t)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)an0∣∣∣
·
∣∣∣aˆn2,l(t)− aˆn2,l−1(t)∣∣∣;
17
and the eighth inequality follows from the fact that
−1 ≤ hnk(a) ≤ 0.
This implies that
‖aˆn1,l+1 − aˆn1,l‖∞ ≤
κ1λ(λ1 + λ)
(
1 + θ1
C(n)na
)
λ21
‖aˆn2,l − aˆn2,l−1‖∞,
and by symmetry, we also have
‖aˆn2,l − aˆn2,l−1‖∞ ≤
κ2λ(λ2 + λ)
(
1 + θ2
C(n)na
)
λ22
‖aˆn1,l(t)− aˆn1,l−1‖∞,
which implies that
‖aˆn1,l+1 − aˆn1,l‖∞
≤ κ1κ2
λ(λ1 + λ)
(
1 + θ1
C(n)na
)
λ21
λ(λ2 + λ)
(
1 + θ2
C(n)na
)
λ22
 ‖aˆn1,l − aˆn1,l−1‖∞ (36)
≤
κ1κ2
λ(λ1 + λ)
(
1 + θ1
C(n)na
)
λ21
λ(λ2 + λ)
(
1 + θ2
C(n)na
)
λ22
l ‖aˆn1,1 − aˆn1,0‖∞.
This shows that, given a large integer n, for any m > n, we have
‖aˆn1,m(t)− aˆn1,n(t)‖∞ ≤
∞∑
l=n
‖aˆn1,l+1(t)− aˆn1,l(t)‖∞
≤
(
Υn
1−Υ
)
||aˆn1,1(t)− aˆn1,0(t)||∞,
where
Υ , κ1κ2
λ(λ1 + λ)
(
1 + θ1
C(n)na
)
λ21
λ(λ2 + λ)
(
1 + θ2
C(n)na
)
λ22
 .
Based on the uniform boundedness of sequence {aˆn1,l} and the assumption that Υ < 1, we
can henceforth conclude that {aˆn1,l} is Cauchy sequence with respect to uniform norm. This
means that the left and right-hand sides of system (32) converge uniformly to a limit aˆnk,
for k = 1, 2, when l approaches to ∞. To show uniqueness of the limit aˆnk, for k = 1, 2,
assume that there exist more than one limits, i.e. ank and aˆ
n
k. We can then follow the similar
arguments above leading to (36) to arrive with the desired contradiction.
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6 Nash equilibrium for insurers in diffusion-approximated
model: Case of CARA insurers
Having established the Nash equilibrium for the case of general compound Poisson risk model,
we shall consider finding the Nash equilibrium of Problem 3.1 for the diffusion approximated
model (see, for example, Rolski et al. (1999)).
Consider the process {Xˆ pikk (t)}t≥0, for {p˜ik}t≥0 , {(a˜k(t), b˜k(t))}t≥0 ∈ Πk, where
dXˆ p˜ikk (t) =
{
rXˆ p˜ikk (t) + (λk + λ)[θkµk(a˜k(t)) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]
−κk(λj + λ)[θjµj(a˜j(t)) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
+m[b˜k(t)− κkb˜j(t)]L(t)
}
dt+ [b˜k(t)− κkb˜j(t)]
√
L(t)dBS(t)
−γkdBZk(t) + κkγjdBZj(t)
Xˆ p˜ikk (0) = xˆk,
(37)
where {BZk}t≥0 denotes the standard Brownian motion and that
γk ,
√
(λ+ λk)E[(Zk ∧ a˜k)2],
d〈BZ1 , BZ2〉 = ρdt, where ρ , λ
γ1γ2
E[(Z1 ∧ a˜1)]E[(Z2 ∧ a˜2)],
and d〈BZk , BS〉 = 0, for k 6= j ∈ {1, 2}.
To study the Nash equilibrium between two insurers with the surplus difference process
{Xˆ p˜ikk (t)}t≥0 in (37), for k = 1, 2, consider the corresponding objective function of insurer k,
for k = 1, 2, denoted as J˜k, where
J˜k(t, xk, xj, p˜ik(t), p˜ij(t)) , E
[
Uk
(
Xˆ p˜ikk (T )
)
|Xˆ p˜ikk (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
, (38)
Given the strategy of his competitor j ∈ {1, 2}, i.e. p˜ij = (a˜j, b˜j), the objective function
J˜k(t, xk, xj, p˜ik(t), p˜ij(t)) of insurer k 6= j is to find an optimal strategy ˆ˜pik , (ˆ˜ak, ˆ˜bk) such that
max
p˜ik=(a˜k,b˜k)∈Πk
J˜k(t, xk, xj, p˜ik(t), p˜ij(t)) = J˜k(t, xk, xj, ˆ˜pik(t), p˜ij(t)),
Denote V˜ k to be the corresponding value function of insurer k, i.e.
V˜ k(t, x, l) , sup
p˜ik∈Πk
E
[
Uk
(
Xˆ p˜ikk (T )
)
|Xˆ p˜ikk (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
, (39)
and the corresponding Nash equilibrium is{
J˜1(t, x1, x2, ˆ˜pi1(t), p˜i
∗
2(t)) ≤ J˜1(t, x1, x2, p˜i∗1(t), p˜i∗2(t)),
J˜2(t, x2, x1, ˆ˜pi2(t), p˜i
∗
1(t)) ≤ J˜2(t, x2, x1, p˜i∗2(t), p˜i∗1(t)).
(40)
The following theorem provides the Nash equilibrium for the case of the diffusion-approximated
process
{
Xˆ p˜ikk (t)
}
t≥0
.
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Theorem 6.1. Assume that κ1κ2 < 1. Suppose that insurer k, for k = 1, 2, has an expo-
nential utility function Uk in (17) and the relative wealth process {Xˆ p˜ikk (t)}t≥0 in (37). The
value function V˜ k(t, x, l) of insurer k, for k = 1, 2, at equilibrium is
V˜ k(t, x, l) = − 1
qk
exp
{
−qk
[
xer(T−t) + f˜k(t)
]
− A(t)l −B(t)
}
, (41)
where A(t), B(t) are given in (21), (22) and
f˜k(t) =
[
(λk + λ)(ηk − θk)
r
µ¯k − κk(λj + λ)(ηj − θj)
r
µ¯j
] [
1− er(T−t)]
−(λk + λ)θk
∫ T
t
er(T−s)µk(a˜∗k(s))ds+ κk(λj + λ)θj
∫ T
t
er(T−s)µj(a˜∗j(s))ds
+(λk + λ)qk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
∫ a˜∗k(s)
0
yF k(y)dyds
+κ2k(λj + λ)qk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
∫ a˜∗j (s)
0
yF j(y)dyds
−λκkqk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
(∫ a˜∗k(s)
0
F k(y)dy
)(∫ a˜∗j (s)
0
F j(y)dy
)
ds, (42)
for k, j = 1, 2 with k 6= j. Let ˆ˜ak, for k = 1, 2, be the solutions to the following system of
equations, 
ˆ˜a1(t) =
λκ1
λ1+λ
∫ ˆ˜a2(t)
0
F 2(y)dy +
θ1
q1
e−r(T−t),
ˆ˜a2(t) =
λκ2
λ2+λ
∫ ˆ˜a1(t)
0
F 1(y)dy +
θ2
q2
e−r(T−t),
(43)
then the equilibrium reinsurance strategies ˆ˜a∗k, for k = 1, 2, for Problem 3.1 admit one of the
following forms: for k 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
1. If ˆ˜ak(t) ≤ Dk and ˆ˜aj(t) ≤ Dj, then (a˜∗k(t), a˜∗j(t)) = (ˆ˜ak(t), ˆ˜aj(t));
2. If ˆ˜ak(t) > Dk and ˆ˜aj(t) ≤ Dj, then (a˜∗k(t), a˜∗j(t)) =
(
Dk,
[
λκj
λj+λ
∫ Dk
0
F k(y)dy +
θj
qj
e−r(T−t)
]
∧Dj
)
;
3. If ˆ˜ak(t) > Dk and ˆ˜aj(t) > Dj, then (a˜
∗
k(t), a˜
∗
j(t)) = (Dk, Dj);
and the investment strategies b˜∗k, for k = 1, 2, are given by (24).
Proof. Following the notations and assumptions in Theorem 4.1, let W˜ k(t, x, l) ∈ C1,2(Γ) ∩
C0(Γ), for k = 1, 2, be a solution of the following HJB equation,
0 = W˜ kt (t, x, l) + sup
pik∈Πk
{[
rx+ (λk + λ)[θkµk(a˜k) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]
−κk(λj + λ)[θjµj(ˆ˜aj) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j] +m[b˜k − κkˆ˜bj]l
]
W˜ kx (t, x, l)
+
1
2
[
(λk + λ)
(∫ a˜k
0
2yF k(y)dy
)
+ κ2k(λj + λ)
(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
2yF j(y)dy
)
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−2κkλ
(∫ a˜k
0
F k(y)dy
)(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
F j(y)dy
)
+ b˜2kl + κ
2
k
ˆ˜b2j l − 2κkb˜kˆ˜bjl
]
W˜ kxx(t, x, l)
+α(δ − l)W˜ kl (t, x, l) +
1
2
σ2lW˜ kll (t, x, l) + ρSσl[b˜k − κkˆ˜bj]W˜ kxl(t, x, l)
}
. (44)
Consider the following Ansatz W k(t, x, l),
W˜ k(t, x, l) = − 1
qk
exp
{
−qk
[
xer(T−t) + f˜k(t) + gk(t, l)
]}
. (45)
We shall prove the verification theorem for V˜ k = W˜ k in Appendix A. Since
W˜ kt = (rqkxe
r(T−t) − qkf˜kt − qkgkt )W˜ k, W˜ kx = −qker(T−t)W˜ k, W˜ kxx = q2ke2r(T−t)W˜ k,
W˜ kl = −qkgkl W˜ k, W kll = q2k(gkl )2W˜ k, W˜ kxl = q2ker(T−t)gkl W˜ k,
(46)
the corresponding HJB equation in (44) becomes
0 = (rqkxe
r(T−t) − qkf˜kt − qkgkt )W˜ k
+ sup
pik∈Πk
{[
rx+ (λk + λ)[θkµk(a˜k) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]− κk(λj + λ)[θjµj(ˆ˜aj) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
+m[b˜k − κkˆ˜bj]l
] (
−qker(T−t)W˜ k
)
+
1
2
[
(λk + λ)
(∫ a˜k
0
2yF k(y)dy
)
+κ2k(λj + λ)
(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
2yF j(y)dy
)
− 2κkλ
(∫ a˜k
0
F k(y)dy
)(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
F j(y)dy
)
+b˜2kl + κ
2
k
ˆ˜b2j − 2κkb˜kˆ˜bjl
](
q2ke
2r(T−t)W˜ k
)
+α(δ − l)
(
−qkgkl W˜ k
)
+
1
2
σ2l
(
q2k(g
k
l )
2W˜ k
)
+ ρSσl[b˜k − κkˆ˜bj]
(
q2ke
r(T−t)gkl W˜
k
)}
=
(
rqkxe
r(T−t) − qkf˜kt − qkgkt
)
−
(
rx+ (λk + λ)(ηk − θk)µ¯k
−κk(λj + λ)[θjµj(ˆ˜aj) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
−mκkˆ˜bjl
)
qke
r(T−t) +
1
2
[
κ2k(λj + λ)
(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
2zF j(y)dy
)
+ κ2k
ˆ˜b2j
] (
q2ke
2r(T−t))
−α(δ − l)qkgkl +
1
2
lσ2q2k(g
k
l )
2 − ρSσlκkˆ˜bjq2kgkl er(T−t) + sup
a˜k
{
− (λk + λ)θkµk(a˜k)qker(T−t)
+
1
2
[
(λk + λ)
(∫ a˜k
0
2zF k(y)dy
)
− 2κkλ
(∫ a˜k
0
F k(y)dy
)(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
F j(y)dy
)]
q2ke
2r(T−t)
}
+ sup
b˜k
{
−mb˜klqker(T−t) + 1
2
[
b˜2kl − 2κkb˜kˆ˜bjl
]
q2ke
2r(T−t) + ρSσlb˜kq2kg
k
l e
r(T−t)
}
.
As it is easy to see that the investment strategy of insurer k at equilibrium b˜∗k, for k = 1, 2,
admits the form in (24), i.e b˜∗k = b
∗,n
k , where b
∗,n
k is given in Theorem 5.1, we shall hereafter
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focus exclusively on the reinsurance strategies, a˜∗k, for k = 1, 2. By the first order condition
for a˜k, we have
0 = −(λk + λ)θkF k(a˜k) +
[
(λk + λ)a˜kF k(a˜k)− κkλF k(a˜k)
(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
F j(y)dy
)]
qke
r(T−t),
which gives
ˆ˜ak =
κkλ
λk + λ
(∫ ˆ˜aj
0
F j(y)dy
)
+
θke
−r(T−t)
qk
.
Hence, it follows that the desired equilibrium reinsurance strategy (a˜∗1, a˜
∗
2) can be obtained
when we can show that of the system of equations in (43) admits unique solution (ˆ˜a1, ˆ˜a2).
To solve for (ˆ˜a1, ˆ˜a2), consider the following sequence {ˆ˜a1,l}∞l=0:{
ˆ˜a1,0(t) , θ1e
−r(T−t)
q1
,
ˆ˜a1,l(t) , κ1λλ1+λ
∫ ˆ˜a2,l−1(t)
0
F 2(y)dy +
θ1e−r(T−t)
q1
, for l ≥ 1, (47)
where
ˆ˜a2,l(t) =
κ2λ
λ2 + λ
∫ ˆ˜a1,l(t)
0
F 1(y)dy +
θ2e
−r(T−t)
q2
,
for l ∈ N.
Next, we show that {ˆ˜a1,l}∞l=0 is a Cauchy sequence with respect to the uniform norm; indeed,
note that
|ˆ˜a1,l+1(t)− ˆ˜a1,l(t)| =
∣∣∣∣∣ κ1λλ1 + λ
∫ ˆ˜a2,l(t)
ˆ˜a2,l−1(t)
F 2(y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ κ1λλ1 + λ
∫ ˆ˜a2,l(t)
ˆ˜a2,l−1(t)
dy
∣∣∣ = κ1λ
λ1 + λ
∣∣∣ˆ˜a2,l(t)− ˆ˜a2,l−1(t)∣∣∣.
From (47), it is easy to see that ˆ˜ak,l(t) is uniformly bounded for k = 1, 2, and l ∈ N, and
henceforth we have
‖ˆ˜a1,l+1 − ˆ˜a1,l‖∞ ≤ κ1λ
λ1 + λ
‖ˆ˜a2,l − ˆ˜a2,l−1‖∞.
By symmetry, we also have,
‖ˆ˜a2,l − ˆ˜a2,l−1‖∞ ≤ κ2λ
λ2 + λ
‖ˆ˜a1,l − ˆ˜a1,l−1‖∞.
This readily implies that
‖ˆ˜a1,l+1(t)− ˆ˜a1,l‖∞ ≤
(
κ1λ
λ1 + λ
)[(
κ2λ
λ2 + λ
)
‖ˆ˜a1,l − ˆ˜a1,l−1‖∞
]
(48)
≤
[
κ1κ2
(
λ
λ1 + λ
)(
λ
λ2 + λ
)]l
‖ˆ˜a1,1 − ˆ˜a1,0‖∞
≤ Υ˜l‖ˆ˜a1,1 − ˆ˜a1,0‖∞.
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This shows that, given a large integer n, for any m > n, we have
‖ˆ˜a1,m − ˆ˜a1,n‖∞ ≤
∞∑
l=n
‖ˆ˜a1,l+1(t)− ˆ˜a1,l(t)‖∞
≤ Υ˜
n
1− Υ¯‖
ˆ˜a1,1(t)− ˆ˜a1,0(t)‖∞,
where
Υ˜ , κ1κ2
(
λ
λ1 + λ
)(
λ
λ2 + λ
)
.
Based on the uniform boundedness of sequence {ˆ˜a1,l} and Υ˜ < 1 under the assumption
κ1κ2 < 1, we can henceforth conclude that {ˆ˜a1,l} is Cauchy sequence with respect to uniform
norm. This means that the left and right-hand sides of system (47) converge uniformly to
a limit ˆ˜ak, for k = 1, 2, when l approaches to ∞. To show uniqueness of the limit ˆ˜ak, for
k = 1, 2, assume that there exist more than one limits, i.e. a˜k and ˆ˜ak. We can then follow
the similar arguments above leading to (48) to arrive with the desired contradiction.
Finally, substituting (46) and the expressions of a˜∗k and b˜
∗
k into (44) gives
0 = f˜kt +
(
(λk + λ)[θkµk(a˜
∗
k) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]− κk(λj + λ)[θjµj(a˜∗j) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
)
er(T−t)
−1
2
[
(λk + λ)
(∫ a˜∗k
0
2zF k(y)dy
)
− 2κkλ
(∫ a˜∗k
0
F k(y)dy
)
+
(∫ a˜∗j
0
F j(y)dy
)
κ2k(λj + λ)
(∫ a˜∗j
0
2zF j(y)dy
)]
qke
2r(T−t),
of which (42) follows readily.
Different from Theorem 5.1, Theorem 6.1 does not require additional assumption as to guar-
antee the reinsurance strategies, a˜∗k, for k = 1, 2, to uniquely exist. This indicates the high
analytical tractability of the diffusion-approximated process {Xˆ p˜ikk }t≥0 is maintained in the
context of the nonzero-sum game framework. We now establish the connection between
Nash equilibria under the general compound Poisson process {Xˆpinkk }t≥0 and and the asso-
ciated diffusion-approximated process as n → ∞. More specifically, the following theorem
shows that the Nash equilibrium under the diffusion-approximated process is the -Nash
equilibrium for the general compound Poisson process.
Theorem 6.2. Assume that C(n) = O
(
n−
a
2
)
. Under the condition that
lim sup
n→∞
(max {‖a∗,n1 ‖∞, ‖a∗,n2 ‖∞}) <∞, (49)
then
1. For k = 1, 2,
‖a∗,nk − a˜∗k‖∞ = O(n−
a
2 ), (50)
where a∗,nk and a˜
∗
k are the equilibrium reinsurance strategies of insurer k in Theorem 5.1
and Theorem 6.1, respectively;
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2. For each xˆk, l ∈ R,
‖V k,n(., xˆ, l)− V˜ k(., xˆ, l)‖∞ = O(n− a2 ), (51)
where the value functions V k,n and V˜ k are the value functions of insurer k, for k = 1, 2,
in (19) and (41), respectively.;
3. For each xk, xj ∈ R, for k = 1, 2 and k 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
‖Jnk (., xk, xj, pi∗,nk , pi∗,nj )− Jnk (., xk, xj, p˜ik, p˜ij)‖∞ = O
(
n−
a
2
)
, (52)
i.e. Nash equilibrium under the diffusion-approximated process (p˜i1, p˜i2) serves as an -Nash
equilibrium under the general Poisson process (pi∗,n1 , pi
∗,n
2 ).
Proof. Without any loss of generality, we let K <∞ to be some constant such that
lim sup
n→∞
(max {‖a∗,n1 ‖∞, ‖a∗,n2 ‖∞}) < K. (53)
From (53), it follows that there exists an n∗ ∈ N, such that for all n > n∗,
|naC(n)hnk(a∗,nj (t))| = naC(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ a∗,nj (t)
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)yF j(y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ naC(n)
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ a∗,nj (t)
0
κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)ydy
∣∣∣∣∣
= naC(n)κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)e−κkqke
r(T−t)C(n)a0|a∗,nj (t)|
≤ na (C(n))2 κkqkerTK = O(1), (54)
where the second equality follows from the mean-value theorem for some a0 ∈ [0, a∗,nj (t)].
Since −1 ≤ hnk(a) ≤ 0, for all a ≥ 0, together with (54), it follows readily that[
(λk + λ)θk − λnaC(n)hnk(a∗,nj (t))
λk + λ[hnk(a
∗,n
j (t)) + 1]
]
= O(1),
for all n > n∗. Therefore, for all n > n∗, a∗,nk (t) can be rewritten as follows, by first expanding
it as a Taylor series,
a∗,nk (t) =
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
ln
 (λk + λ)
(
1 + θk
naC(n)
)
λk + λ
[
hnk(a
∗,n
j (t)) + 1
]

=
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
{(
1
naC(n)
)[
(λk + λ)θk − λnaC(n)hnk(a∗,nj (t))
λk + λ[hnk(a
∗,n
j (t)) + 1]
]
−
(
1
2n2a(C(n))2
)[
(λk + λ)θk − λnaC(n)hnk(a∗,nj (t))
λk + λ[hnk(a
∗,n
j (t)) + 1]
]2
+O
(
n−
3a
2
)}
=
e−r(T−t)
qkna(C(n))2
[
(λk + λ)θk − λnaC(n)hnk(a∗,nj (t))
λk + λ[hnk(a
∗,n
j (t)) + 1]
]
+O
(
n−
a
2
)
(55)
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Let K˜ , max{‖a˜∗1‖∞, ‖a˜∗2‖∞}. Combining (55) with a˜∗1(t) in (43), we have, for all n > n∗,
|a∗,n1 (t)− a˜∗1(t)| ≤
∣∣∣∣ e−r(T−t)q1(C(n))2na
[
(λ1 + λ)θ1
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
]
− θ1
q1
e−r(T−t)
−e
−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
λhn1(a
∗,n
2 (t))
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
− λκ1
λ1 + λ
∫ a˜2(t)
0
F 2(y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣+O(n− a2)
≤ e
−r(T−t)θ1
q1(C(n))2na
(λ1 + λ) |1− (C(n))2na|(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
)
+
e−r(T−t)λθ1
q1
∣∣∣∫ a∗,n2 (t)0 κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)yF 2(y)dy∣∣∣(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
)
+
e−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
[
λ
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
]
·
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ a∗,n2 (t)
a˜2(t)
κ1q1e
r(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1e
r(T−t)C(n)yF 2(y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣
+
[
λκ1
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
] ∫ a˜2(t)
0
∣∣∣e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)y − 1∣∣∣F 2(y)dy
+
∣∣∣∣ λκ1λ1 + λ[hn1(a∗,n2 (t)) + 1] − λκ1λ1 + λ
∣∣∣∣∫ a˜2(t)
0
F 2(y)dy +O
(
n−
a
2
)
≤ e
−r(T−t)θ1
q1(C(n))2na
(λ1 + λ) |1− (C(n))2na|(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
)
+
e−r(T−t)λθ1
q1
∣∣∣∫ a∗,n2 (t)0 κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)ydy∣∣∣(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
)
+
e−r(T−t)
q1C(n)
[
λ
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
] ∣∣∣∣∣
∫ a∗,n2 (t)
a˜2(t)
κ1q1e
r(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1e
r(T−t)C(n)ydy
∣∣∣∣∣
+
[
λκ1
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
] ∫ a˜2(t)
0
∣∣∣e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)y − 1∣∣∣ dy
+
λ2κ1
∣∣∣∫ a∗,n2 (t)0 κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)ydy∣∣∣
(λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]) (λ1 + λ)
a˜2(t) +O
(
n−
a
2
)
≤ e
−r(T−t)θ1
q1(C(n))2na
(λ1 + λ) |1− (C(n))2na|(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
) + κ1λθ1a∗,n2 (t)(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
)C(n)
+
λκ1
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
|a∗,n2 (t)− a˜2(t)|+
2λκ21q1e
r(T−t)C(n)
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
∫ a˜2(t)
0
ydy
+
λ2κ21q1e
r(T−t)a∗,n2 (t)a˜2(t)
(λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]) (λ1 + λ)
C(n) +O
(
n−
a
2
)
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≤ e
−r(T−t)θ1
q1(C(n))2na
(λ1 + λ) |1− (C(n))2na|(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
) + κ1λθ1K(
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
)C(n)
+
λκ1
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
|a∗,n2 (t)− a˜2(t)|+
λκ21q1e
r(T−t)K˜2
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
C(n)
+
λ2κ21q1e
r(T−t)KK˜
(λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]) (λ1 + λ)
C(n) +O
(
n−
a
2
)
=
λκ1
λ1 + λ[hn1(a
∗,n
2 (t)) + 1]
|a∗,n2 (t)− a˜2(t)|+O
(
n−
a
2
)
,
where the third inequality follows from the fact that 0 ≤ F 2(y) ≤ 1, for y ≥ 0; the fourth
inequality follows from the mean-value theorem, i.e., for any a, b ≥ 0, there exists c ∈
[a ∧ b, a ∨ b] such that
|hn1(a)− hn1(b)| = κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1e
r(T−t)C(n)c|b− a| ≤ κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)|b− a|; (56)
the fifth inequality follows from the definitions of the upper bounds K and K˜; and the sixth
equality follows from the assumption that C(n) = O
(
n−
a
2
)
and the fact that −1 ≤ hn1(a) ≤ 0,
for all a ≥ 0.
By symmetry, the above inequality becomes
‖a∗,n1 − a˜∗1‖∞ ≤
∥∥∥∥ λκ1λ1 + λ[hn1(a∗,n2 ) + 1]
∥∥∥∥
∞
‖a∗,n2 − a˜2‖∞ +O
(
n−
a
2
)
≤
∥∥∥∥ λ2κ1κ2(λ1 + λ[hn1(a∗,n2 ) + 1]) (λ2 + λ[hn2(a∗,n1 ) + 1])
∥∥∥∥
∞
‖a∗,n1 − a˜1‖∞ +O
(
n−
a
2
)
= Yn ‖a∗,n1 − a˜1‖∞ +O
(
n−
a
2
)
, (57)
where Yn ,
∥∥∥∥ λ2κ1κ2(λ1+λ[hn1(a∗,n2 )+1])(λ2+λ[hn2(a∗,n1 )+1])
∥∥∥∥
∞
. From (56), for a > 0, there exists a˜ ∈ [0, a]
such that, for n > n∗,
|hn1(a))| = κ1q1er(T−t)C(n)e−κ1q1e
r(T−t)C(n)a˜|a| < κ1q1erTC(n)K = O (C(n)) ,
where the last inequality follows from condition (53). Therefore, for n > n∗,∥∥∥∥ λ2κ1κ2(λ1 + λ[hn1(a∗,n2 ) + 1]) (λ2 + λ[hn2(a∗,n1 ) + 1]) − λ
2κ1κ2
(λ1 + λ)(λ2 + λ)
∥∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥∥ λ(λ1 + λ)hn1(a∗,n2 ) + λ(λ2 + λ)hn2(a∗,n1 )− λ2hn1(a∗,n2 )hn2(a∗,n1 )(λ1 + λ)(λ2 + λ) (λ1 + λ[hn1(a∗,n2 ) + 1]) (λ2 + λ[hn2(a∗,n1 ) + 1])
∥∥∥∥
∞
= O (C(n)) , (58)
i.e. lim supn→∞ Yn = λ
2κ1κ2
(λ1+λ)(λ2+λ)
< 1. Therefore, (57) becomes, for all n > n∗,
‖a∗,n1 − a˜∗1‖∞ ≤
1
1− YnO
(
n−
a
2
)
= O
(
n−
a
2
)
.
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In view of V k,n in (19) and V˜ k in (39), to show (51), it suffices to show that
‖f˜k,n − fk,n‖∞ = O(n− a2 ), for k = 1, 2.
For n > n∗, ‖a∗,nk ‖∞ < K, for k = 1, 2, and hence we have, for 0 ≤ s ≤ T ,{
eqkC(n)ye
r(T−s)
= 1 + qkC(n)ye
r(T−s) +O (n−a) , for 0 ≤ y ≤ a∗,nk (s),
e−κkqkC(n)ye
r(T−s)
= 1− κkqkC(n)yer(T−s) +O (n−a) , for 0 ≤ y ≤ a∗,nj (s).
(59)
Substituting (59) into fk,n in (20), we then have:
fk,n(t) =
[
(λk + λ)(ηk − θk)
r
µ¯k − κk(λj + λ)(ηj − θj)
r
µ¯j
] [
1− er(T−t)]
−(λk + λ)θk
∫ T
t
er(T−s)µk(a
∗,n
k (s))ds+ κk(λj + λ)θj
∫ T
t
er(T−s)µj(a
∗,n
j (s))ds
+(λk + λ)n
a(C(n))2qk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
yF k(y)dy
]
ds
+(λj + λ)n
a(C(n))2κ2kqk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
yF j(y)dy
]
ds
−λna(C(n))2κkqk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
F k(y)dy
][ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
F j(y)dy
]
ds
+λna(C(n))3κ2kq
2
k
∫ T
t
e3r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
F k(y)dy
][ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
yF j(y)dy
]
ds
−λna(C(n))3κkq2k
∫ T
t
e3r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
yF k(y)dy
][ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
F j(y)dy
]
ds
+λna(C(n))4κ2kq
3
k
∫ T
t
e4r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
yF k(y)dy
][ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
yF j(y)dy
]
ds
+O
(
n−
a
2
)
. (60)
Combining (60) with f˜k in (42), direct calculation yields that, for n > n∗,
|f˜k(t)− fk,n(t)| ≤ (λk + λ)θk
∫ T
t
er(T−s) |µk(a˜∗k(s))− µk(a∗,nk (s))| ds
+κk(λj + λ)θj
∫ T
t
er(T−s)|µj(a˜∗j(s))− µj(a∗,nj (s))|ds
+(λk + λ)qk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ a˜∗k(s)
a∗,nk (s)
yF k(y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣ ds
+κ2k(λj + λ)qk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ a˜∗j (s)
a∗,nj (s)
yF j(y)dy
∣∣∣∣∣ ds
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+λκkqk
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)
[∣∣∣∣∣
(∫ a˜∗k(s)
a∗,nk (s)
F k(y)dy
)(∫ a˜∗j (s)
0
F j(y)dy
)∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
(∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
F k(y)dy
)(∫ a˜∗j (s)
a∗,nj (s)
F j(y)dy
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
ds
+
∣∣∣∣∣λna(C(n))3κ2kq2k
∫ T
t
e3r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
F k(y)dy
][ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
yF j(y)dy
]
ds
−λna(C(n))3κkq2k
∫ T
t
e3r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
yF k(y)dy
][ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
F j(y)dy
]
ds
+λna(C(n))4κ2kq
3
k
∫ T
t
e4r(T−s)
[ ∫ a∗,nk (s)
0
yF k(y)dy
][ ∫ a∗,nj (s)
0
yF j(y)dy
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
+O
(
n−
a
2
)
fro which the desired result (51) follows from the condition (53), together with the assumption
that C(n) = O
(
n−
a
2
)
and that ‖a˜∗k − a∗,nk ‖∞ = O(n−
a
2 ), for k = 1, 2.
Finally, from the definitions of the objection function of insurer k, for k = 1, 2, Jnk in (6)
(respectively, J˜k in (38)) and the corresponding value function V
k,n in (9) (respectively, V˜ k
in (39)), we see that (51) is equivalent to
‖Jnk (., xk, xj, pi∗,nk , pi∗,nj )− J˜k(., xk, xj, p˜i∗k, p˜i∗j )‖∞ = O(n−
a
2 ).
By similar arguments, we can also deduce that
‖J˜k(., xk, xj, p˜i∗k, p˜i∗j )− Jnk (., xk, xj, p˜i∗k, p˜i∗j )‖∞ = O(n−
a
2 ),
from which (52) follows by observing that
‖Jnk (., xk, xj, pi∗,nk , pi∗,nj )− Jnk (., xk, xj, p˜i∗k, p˜i∗j )‖∞ ≤ ‖Jnk (., xk, xj, pi∗,nk , pi∗,nj )− J˜k(., xk, xj, p˜i∗k, p˜i∗j )‖∞
+‖J˜k(., xk, xj, p˜i∗k, p˜i∗j )− Jnk (., xk, xj, p˜i∗k, p˜i∗j )‖∞
= O(n−
a
2 ).
Remark 6.3. For the case when a = 1 and C(n) = n−
1
2 , we can recover the weak convergence
result in Theorem 2.1 of Bai et al. (2013) that
Xˆ
pink
k =⇒ Xˆ p˜ikk , as n→∞.
Remark 6.4. In the proof of Theorem 6.2, under condition (49), (58) shows explicitly that
the condition of Nash equilibrium under the general Poisson process, i.e. Yn < 1, is satisfied
automatically for sufficiently large n.
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7 Numerical studies
Base parameters
m r α δ σ ρS T λ
1.5 0.05 2 0.3 1 −0.3/0.3 10 0.5
Insurer 1
θ1 λ1 q1 κ1
0.1 1 0.2 0.3
Insurer 2
θ2 λ2 q2 κ2
0.8 4 0.9 0.7
Table 1: Model parameters
In this section, we shall illustrate the Nash equilibrium reinsurance and investment strategies
under the CARA insurers in Sections 5 and 6. In addition, we assume that F1(y) = 1− 1(1+y)3
and F2(y) = 1−e−2y, for y ≥ 0. Unless otherwise stated, the following numerical illustrations
are based on the model parameters as specified in Table 1.
7.1 Equilibrium reinsurance strategies
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Figure 1: Effect of κk on the equilibrium reinsurance strategy of insurer k, a
∗,1
k , for k = 1, 2
Figure 1 displays the effect of competition on the equilibrium reinsurance strategies under the
Poisson model in Section 5 when n = 1 and C(n) ≡ 1. Observe first that both insurers increase
their respective retention levels a∗,1k , for k = 1, 2, at equilibrium as t approaches to T . As the
main objective of each insurer is to maximize the expected relative wealth at the terminal
time T , each insurer wants to minimize the expenditure on the reinsurance protection by
increasing his own retention level. The effect of competition is illustrated via the sensitivity
parameter κk, for k = 1, 2. In Figure 1, we see that the equilibrium retention level a
∗,1
k , for
k = 1, 2, increases as κk increases, with the absence of competition represented by the case
when κk = 0. This can be explained by the fact that the relative performance concern makes
each insurer to be more risk-taking by increasing his respective retention levels as they are
more concern with his expected terminal wealth relative to that of his competitors. This is
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also consistent with the proportional reinsurance protection game considered in Bensoussan
et al. (2014). Finally, note that although both insurers increase their respective retention
levels as each of their own κk increases, increment in insurer 2’s retention level is relatively
small compared with that of insurer 1. This is due to the fact that insurer 2 is more risk-
averse than insurer 1, ceteris paribus, i.e. q2 = 0.9 > 0.2 = q1. Hence, even if insurer 2 is
more concerned with his relative performance against that of insurer 1 (κ2 = 0.7 > 0.3 = κ1),
insurer 2 is relatively risk-averse that he refrains himself from aggressively minimizing the
reinsurance protection by increasing the retention level dramatically.
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Figure 2: Effect of λ on the equilibrium reinsurance strategy of insurer k, a∗,1k , for k = 1, 2
Figure 2 studies the effect of the systematic risk generated from the common intensity λ of
the Poisson risk model in (4) on the equilibrium reinsurance strategy a∗,1k (t), for k = 1, 2
and t ∈ [0, T ]. The case when both insurers have independent claim processes is represented
by λ = 0, under which we recover the classical optimal excess-of-loss retention level in the
absence of competition. Indeed, when λ = 0, the coupling effect in the integral-typed system
(23) disappears, and we then have a∗,nk (t) =
e−r(T−t)
qkC(n)
ln
(
1 + θk
naC(n)
)
, for k = 1, 2, n ∈ N, and
a ≥ 1. In other words, when λ = 0, the relative performance concern of each insurer becomes
irrelevant in the context of reinsurance protection, as he would simply choose his optimal
reinsurance protection as if there were no competition.
On the other hand, as λ increases, the correlation between both insurers’ claim risks increases.
The prime objective of each insurer is to maximize his relative surplus relative to that of his
competitor, and hence an increase in correlation of their claim risks minimizes the relative
difference of their surpluses. As the arrival of common claim, measured by the intensity λ,
affects both of them, there is certainly no reason to increase his excess-of-loss reinsurance
expenditure with an increasing λ, for it would do nothing or even negatively to maximize his
relative terminal surplus against his competitor. Instead, the best response of each insurer
to the increase of λ is then to decrease the corresponding expenditure on their excess-of-loss
reinsurance, i.e. by increasing his retention level a∗,1k (t), for k = 1, 2, so as to limit the
potential of common loss. This effect is summarized in Figure 2.
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Figure 3: Effect of κk on the equilibrium reinsurance strategy of insurer k, a˜
∗
k (Diffusion-
approximated model), for k = 1, 2
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Figure 4: Convergence of a∗,n,ak (0) to a˜
∗
k(0) with respect to n (κ1 = 0.3, κ2 = 0.7), for k = 1, 2
and a = 1, 2, 3, at t = 0.
Figure 3 captures the same effects of Figure 1 under the corresponding diffusion-approximated
model in (37) with the model parameters in Table 1. Note that the patterns of the equilibrium
retention levels, a˜∗k, for k = 1, 2, are same as those in Figure 1, albeit with difference values.
To understand the connection between Figures 1 and 3, we now turn to Figure 4. Figure 4
provides the graphical representation of the -Nash equilibrium for the general Compound
Poisson process in Theorem 6.2. More specifically, Figure 4 illustrates the convergence of Nash
equilibrium under the compound Poisson model in (8) to that under the associated diffusion-
approximated process in (37) with respect to n under the case when κ1 = 0.3, κ2 = 0.7 and
t = 0, for a = 1, 2, 3. Denote by a∗,n,ak , for k = 1, 2, the corresponding equilibrium reinsurance
strategy of insurer k under the compound Poisson model in (8). As n increases, we see that
each equilibrium strategy a∗,n,ak , for a = 1, 2, 3, converges to the equilibrium strategy a˜
∗
k, under
the diffusion-approximated model in (37) with different rates. In this respect, parameter a
controls the speed of a∗,n,ak converging to a˜
∗
k with the increasing value of a speeds up the
corresponding convergence. More importantly, Figure 4 shows graphically that the Nash
equilibrium strategies under the diffusion-approximated model, which admits high degree of
31
tractability, can provide an accurate approximation to the Nash equilibrium strategies under
the general Poisson model when the condition (49) in Theorem 6.2 is satisfied.
7.2 Equilibrium investment strategies
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Figure 5: Effect of κk on the equilibrium investment strategy of insurer k, b
∗,1
k , for k = 1, 2
We now proceed to investigate the equilibrium investment strategies, b∗,nk , for k = 1, 2, of the
two CARA insurers in Figure 5 when n = 1 and C(n) ≡ 1. In contrast with the equilibrium
strategies a∗,nk , for k = 1, 2, which are monotonically increasing with respect to t, the change
of the equilibrium investment strategy b∗,1k with respect to t depends on the sign of the
correlation of between the risky asset S and its volatility process L, i.e. ρS. When ρS < 0,
b∗,1k in (24) shows that the term e
−r(T−t) is an increasing function of t, whereas A(t) is a
decreasing function of t. The resolution of this opposite effect is captured in the first row of
Figure 5. On the other hand, when ρS > 0, this opposite effect in (24) disappears and b
∗,1
k
becomes monotonically increasing with respect to t, as appeared in the second row of Figure
5. Since both insurers share the same investment risk by investing in the same risky asset
S, the sign of the correlation effect of the systematic risk from the investment can have a
profound effect on the equilibrium investment of the insurers.
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In addition, Figure 5 also captures the effect of competition on the equilibrium investment
strategies. Contrary to the case of the reinsurance protection, which is an expenditure,
investment into the risky asset S has a possibility of generating income and hence CARA
insurers would increase their exposure to the risky asset S as the time approaches to the
maturity T . Moreover, the presence of competition, which is captured by the sensitivity
parameter κk, for k = 1, 2, induces both CARA insurers to increase their exposure on the
risky asset S. This is true for both cases when ρS is positive or negative. This is also consistent
with the equilibrium investment strategy under the regime-switching case in Bensoussan et
al. (2014).
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Figure 6: Effects of σ and ρS on the equilibrium investment strategy of insurer k, b
∗,1
k , for
k = 1, 2
Figure 6 studies the impact of the volatility of the volatility process L, i.e. σ, on the equi-
librium investment strategies with respect to the correlation ρS. When ρS < 0, increase in
σ results in an increase in investment b∗,1k at equilibrium, as shown in the first row of Figure
6. On the other hand, when ρS > 0, increase in σ leads to a decrease in the investment b
∗,1
k
at equilibrium, as appeared in the second row of Figure 6. This can be explained by the
fact that when ρS < 0, the risky asset S and its volatility process L move in the opposite
directions, implying that there is a compensating effect brought by the volatility process L
to the dynamics of the risky asset S. This in turn leads to a higher expected return of the
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risky asset S, see (3), and hence higher a σ would result in an insurer investing more into
the risky asset S, when ρS < 0. On the other hand, when ρS > 0, the risky asset S and its
volatility process move in the same direction, and the aforementioned compensating effect
from the volatility process L disappears. This means that, any adverse movement in the
volatility process would lead to the erosion in the value of the risky asset, with the resulting
effect being further pronounced by the increasing value of σ. This certainly leads to the
reduction in investment into the risky asset S as σ increases, when ρS > 0. It is worthy
to mention that the effects in Figure 6 are strikingly different from the corresponding result
in Bensoussan et al. (2014). In Bensoussan et al. (2014), the stochastic volatility effect is
modeled by the regime-switching process that is independent of the process of the risky asset.
Hence, as discussed in Bensoussan et al. (2014), increase in σ would always lead to decrease
in investment into the risky asset when Lt = σ, for all t ≥ 0. In other words, the specification
of the correlation factor plays a critical role in quantifying the systematic investment risks of
two competing insurers in equilibrium.
Finally, note that the equilibrium investment strategies b∗,1k for different σ converge to a
common value as t approaches to T . To understand this, we revisit b∗,1k in (24). When
t = T , A(T ) = 0. Hence, b∗,nk (T ) =
1
1−κ1κ2
[
m
qk
+ κkm
qj
]
, for k 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, which is clearly
independent of σ and is the common value to which the equilibrium investment strategies
b∗,1k under different values of σ converge when t = T .
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of common systematic risks on the nonzero-sum rein-
surance and investment game between two insurance companies under a general compound
Poisson risk model. The first source of common systematic risks derives from the mutual de-
pendency between two insurers, by modeling the surplus process of each insurance company
with the correlated compound Poisson risk model. In addition, we consider the excess-of-loss
reinsurance protection, instead of the proportional reinsurance protection, as the excess-of-
loss reinsurance protection is of higher demand in reality. The consideration of the excess-
of-loss reinsurance proves to be more technically demanding to establish the resulting Nash
equilibrium than the case of the proportional reinsurance protection, making the methodology
employed in Bensoussan et al. (2014) not directly applicable in the present context. More
specifically, the existence of the equilibrium excess-of-loss reinsurance strategies is equiva-
lent to the solvability of the coupled non-linear integral-typed equations, as opposed to the
solution of the system of linear equations in Bensoussan et al. (2014). Under some mild con-
dition, we show that the equilibrium reinsurance and investment strategies uniquely exist,
and that we show that this mild condition can be satisfied when the intensity of the sys-
tematic jump risk is relatively small in comparison with the intensities of the idiosyncratic
jump risks of the insurers. Moreover, our numerical example illustrates that increasing the
intensity of the systematic jump risks would lead to an increase the equilibrium retention
level for each insurer, indicating the reduction in the demand of the reinsurance protection at
equilibrium. This fits logically with our understanding on that systematic jump risk affects
both insurers and hence increasing reinsurance protection would only lead to the erosion of
the terminal relative surplus, and hence does not constitute the best response to each insurer.
Finally, to connect the equilibrium results under the compound Poisson risk model to that
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under the diffusion-approximated model, we also provide the explicit equilibrium reinsurance-
investment strategies under the diffusion-approximated model. More importantly, we show
that the Nash equilibrium under the diffusion-approximated process is the -Nash equilibrium
for the general compound Poisson process.
The second source of systematic risk comes from investment on the same risky asset by the
two insurers. We quantify the impact of volatility risk of the risky asset on the insurers’ equi-
librium investment strategies by modeling the risky asset with the popular Heston (1993)
stochastic volatility model. We show that the correlation between the risky asset and its
volatility process determines the directional behaviors of the investment strategies of the
insurers at equilibrium with respect to the parameters of the volatility process. More specif-
ically, we show that when the correlation between the risky asset and its volatility process
is negative (respectively, positive), increasing the level of the volatility process would lead
to an increase (respectively, decrease) in investment on that risky asset in equilibrium. This
enriches the conclusion in Bensoussan et al. (2014) in which the equilibrium investment strat-
egy of each insurer is always inversely proportional to the volatility, i.e. when the volatility
process collapses into a constant. Our result also implies that modeling the correlation factor
can have a significant impact on the dynamics of the equilibrium investment strategies.
There are several extensions of the present work that can be considered. First extension is
to enrich the nonzero-sum game framework to other utility functions. We choose to study
the exponential utility for the sake of tractability and comparative static analyses. For
other utility functions, closed-form solution to the Nash equilibrium may not be available
and reliable numerical scheme is necessary to solve the coupled system of PDEs in Theorem
4.2. Secondly, a consideration of the consumption strategies, in addition to the investment
and reinsurance strategies, can also be interesting as it allows us to investigate intertemporal
consumption behaviors of the insurers under competition. Finally, this paper shows explicitly
the nature of the convergence of the Nash equilibrium under the compound Poisson model to
that under the diffusion-approximated analogue. In this respect, it is also well-known that
a compound Poisson process can be used to approximate wide class of Le´vy processes, e.g.
α-stable process, (see, for example, Corollary 8.8 of Sato (1999)) in addition to the diffusion
process. Since we show that the Nash equilibrium under the general compound Poisson model
uniquely exists with a closed-form expression, it is interesting to see if this result can be used
to study the Nash equilibrium under other Le´vy processes that lacks analytical tractability.
We leave these suggestions for future research.
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A Proof of the Verification Theorem for V k,n in Theo-
rems 5.1 and V˜ k in 6.1
Since the proof of the verification for Theorem 6.1 is analogous to that of Theorem 5.1, we
shall only provide the verification proof for Theorem 5.1 below. In light of Kraft (2005),
Taskar and Zeng (2013), and Zhao et al. (2013), we begin with the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let Q = [0,∞)× [0,∞). Take a sequence of bounded open sets, Q1, Q2, Q3, ...
with Qi ⊂ Qi+1 ⊂ Q, for i ∈ N, and Q = ∪i∈NQi. Denote the exit time of
(
Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (t), L(t)
)
,
for k = 1, 2, from Qi by τi.
Let
W k,n(t, x, l) , − 1
qk
exp
{−qk [xer(T−t) + fk,n(t)]− A(t)l −B(t)} , (61)
where fk,n, A, and B, are of the forms in (20), (21), and (22), respectively. Then
−∞ < E
[
W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)
|Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
< 0,
for all i ∈ N.
Proof. From (8), Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k at equilibrium admits the following form:
Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (t) = e
rt
{
xˆk +
∫ t
0
e−rs
[
(λk + λ)[(θk + n
aC(n))µk(a
∗,n
k (s)) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]
−κk(λj + λ)[(θj + naC(n))µ(a∗,nj (s)) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
e−rsm[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]L(s)ds+
∫ t
0
e−rs[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]
√
L(s)dBS(s)
−
∫ t
0
e−rsC(n)(Zk ∧ a∗,nk (s))d (Nk(nas) +N(nas))
+κk
∫ t
0
e−rsC(n)(Zj ∧ a∗,nj (s))d (Nj(nas) +N(nas))
}
. (62)
Since dBS(s) = ρSdBL(s) +
√
1− ρ2SdB¯(s), where d〈BL(s), B¯(s)〉 = 0, substituting (62) into
the equilibrium value function in (19), we have
W k,n
(
t, Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (t), L(t)
)
= − 1
qk
exp
{
− qkerT xˆk − qkfk,n(t)−B(t)
−qk
∫ t
0
er(T−s)
[
(λk + λ)[(θk + n
aC(n))µk(a
∗,n
k (s)) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]
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−κk(λj + λ)[(θj + naC(n))µ(a∗,nj (s)) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
]
ds
}
· exp
{
− qk
∫ t
0
er(T−s)m[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]L(s)ds
+
q2k(1− ρ2S)
2
∫ t
0
e2r(T−s)[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]2L(s)ds
−qkρS
∫ t
0
er(T−s)[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]
√
L(s)dBL(s)− A(t)L(t)
}
· exp
{
− q
2
k(1− ρ2S)
2
∫ t
0
e2r(T−s)[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]2L(s)ds
−qk
√
1− ρ2S
∫ t
0
er(T−s)[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]
√
L(s)dB¯(s)
}
· exp
{
qkC(n)
∫ t
0
er(T−s)(Zk ∧ a∗,nk (s))d (Nk(nas) +N(nas))
−κkqkC(n)
∫ t
0
er(T−s)(Zj ∧ a∗,nj (s))d (Nj(nas) +N(nas))
}
, Gk1(t)Gk2(t)Gk3(t)Gk4(t), (63)
where, for k = 1, 2,
Gk1(t) ,
1
qk
exp
{
− qkerT xˆk − qkfk,n(t)−B(t)
−qk
∫ t
0
er(T−s)
[
(λk + λ)[(θk + n
aC(n))µk(a
∗,n
k (s)) + (ηk − θk)µ¯k]
−κk(λj + λ)[(θj + naC(n))µ(a∗,nj (s)) + (ηj − θj)µ¯j]
]
ds
}
,
Gk2(t) , − exp
{∫ t
0
fk1 (s)L(s)ds+
∫ t
0
fk2 (s)
√
L(s)dBL(s) + f
k
3 (t)L(t)
}
,
Gk3(t) , exp
{
− q
2
k(1− ρ2S)
2
∫ t
0
e2r(T−s)[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]2L(s)ds
−qk
√
1− ρ2S
∫ t
0
er(T−s)[b∗,nk (s)− κkb∗,nj (s)]
√
L(s)dB¯(s)
}
,
Gk4(t) , exp
{
qkC(n)
∫ t
0
er(T−s)(Zk ∧ a∗,nk (s))d (Nk(nas) +N(nas))
−κkqkC(n)
∫ t
0
er(T−s)(Zj ∧ a∗,nj (s))d (Nj(nas) +N(nas))
}
,
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with
fk1 (t) , −qker(T−t)m[b∗,nk (t)− κkb∗,nj (t)] +
q2k(1− ρ2S)
2
e2r(T−t)[b∗,nk (t)− κkb∗,nj (t)]2,
fk2 (t) , −qkρSer(T−t)[b∗,nk (t)− κkb∗,nj (t)],
fk3 (t) , −A(t),
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Observe first that due to the uniform-boundedness of a∗,nk , for k = 1, 2.Gk1(t) is uniformly
bounded and therefore it follows that 0 < supt∈[0,T ]Gk1(t) <∞.
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to Gk2(t), together with the dynamics of L in (3), gives
dGk2(t) = Gk2(t)
{
αδfk3 (t) + L(t)
[
fk1 (t) +
˙fk3 (t)− αfk3 (t) + 12
(
σfk3 (t) + f
k
2 (t)
)2]}
dt
+Gk2(t)
√
L(t)
[
σfk3 (t) + f
k
2 (t)
]
dBL(t),
Gk2(0) = − exp
(
fk3 (0)L(0)
)
.
(64)
Since b∗,nk admits the form in (24) and A satisfies the ODE in (30), direct calculation shows
that
fk1 (s) +
˙fk3 (s)− αfk3 (s) +
1
2
(
σfk3 (s) + f
k
2 (s)
)2
= 0; (65)
and hence (64) now becomes
Gk2(t) = − exp
(
fk3 (0)L(0) +
∫ t
0
αδfk3 (s)ds
)
· exp
{
− 1
2
∫ t
0
(
σfk3 (s) + f
k
2 (s)
)2
L(s)ds+
∫ t
0
√
L(s)
[
σfk3 (s) + f
k
2 (s)
]
dBL(s)
}
≥ − exp
{
fk3 (0)L(0)−
1
2
∫ t
0
(
σfk3 (s) + f
k
2 (s)
)2
L(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
√
L(s)
[
σfk3 (s) + f
k
2 (s)
]
dBL(s)
}
,
where second inequality A(t) ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and α, δ ≥ 0, which implies that αδfk3 (t) ≤
0, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Finally, from Lemma 5.3, for each n ∈ N and a ≥ 1, a∗,nk , for k = 1, 2, is uniformly bounded.
Together with the well-known fact that Poisson process has almost-surely finite number of
jumps for t ∈ [0, T ], it follows readily that for k = 1, 2, n ∈ N, and a ≥ 1,
0 < E
[
Gk4(t)
] ≤ sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
Gk4(t)
]
<∞. (66)
Denote
Lk(t) , − exp
{
fk3 (0)L(0)−
1
2
∫ t
0
(
σfk3 (s) + f
k
2 (s)
)2
L(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
√
L(s)
[
σfk3 (s) + f
k
2 (s)
]
dBL(s)
}
Gk3(t),
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and note that since Lk(t) ≤ 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ], the local martingale Lk is a submartingale,
i.e
E[Lk(t)] ≥ Lk(0) = − exp
{
fk3 (0)L(0)
}
, (67)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, taking expectation on (63) yields
0 > E
[
W k,n
(
t, Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (t), L(t)
)]
= E
[
Gk1(t)Gk2(t)Gk3(t)Gk4(t)
]
≥
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Gk1(t)
)
E
[
Lk(t)Gk4(t)
]
=
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Gk1(t)
)
E
[
Lk(t)
]
E
[
Gk4(t)
]
≥ −
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Gk1(t)
)
exp
(
fk3 (0)L(0)
)
E
[
Gk4(t)
]
≥ −
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Gk1(t)
)
exp
(
fk3 (0)L(0)
)(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
Gk4(t)
])
> −∞, (68)
where third inequality follows from supt∈[0,T ]Gk1(t) <∞; the fourth equality follows from the
fact that Lk and Gk4 are mutually independent; the fifth inequality follows from (67); and
the sixth inequality follows from (66). Since (68) is independent of t ∈ [0, T ], the result now
readily follows.
Proof. (Proof of the verification theorem in Theorem 5.1)
To verify that W k,n in (61) is the optimal value function of insurer k, for k = 1, 2, we need
to establish (12) and (15) in Theorem 4.1. (12) follows from the arguments in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 in Taskar and Zeng (2013) and the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Zhao et al. (2013),
and we shall omit it here for brevity3. It remains to establish (15).
Denote Q , [0,∞) × [0,∞). Take a sequence of bounded open sets, Q1, Q2, Q3, ... with
Qi ⊂ Qi+1 ⊂ Q, for i ∈ N, and Q = ∪i∈NQi. Denote the exit time of
(
Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (t), L(t)
)
, for
k = 1, 2, from Qi by τi. Then, it follows readily that τi ∧ T → T , as i→∞.
3Alternatively, for the case of CARA insurers, one can first construct a sequence of bounded controls
pink,l , (ank ∧ l ∨ (−l), bnk ∧ l ∨ (−l)), for k = 1, 2, l ∈ N, such that pink,l → pink pointwisely, as l→∞. Secondly,
for an arbitrary family of stopping times {τi}i∈N, by invoking Lemma 4.3 in Taskar and Zeng (2013), one can
follow the proof of Lemma A.1 to establish that, for each l ∈ N, W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
n
k,l
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)
is uniformly integrable. Thirdly, using the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequalities along with some al-
gebraic manipulations, as in the case of Ren (2008), one can show that a priori estimate for the
error term E
[(
W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
n
k,l
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)
−W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
n
k
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
))2]
is quite
independent of l and τi. Combining these aforementioned results, one can readily deduce that
W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
n
k
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)
is also uniformly integrable. With this uniform integrability condi-
tion established for pink , (12) readily follows by interchanging the limit with the expectation operator, as in
the case of proving (15).
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Since pi∗,nk = (a
∗,n
k , b
∗,n
k ) ∈ Πk, which is admissible, applying Itoˆ’s Lemma on W k,n and taking
conditional expectation on
{
Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
}
yields
E
[
W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)
|Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
= W k,n(t, x, l) + E
[∫ τi∧T
t
(
W k,ns + Lpi
∗,n
k W k,n
(
s, Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (s), L(s)
))
ds|Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
= W k,n(t, x, l), (69)
where the second equality follows from the fact that W k,n satisfies the HJB equation in (11)
and a∗,nk , b
∗,n
k are the solutions to (13) and (14), respectively.
Applying Lemma A.1, it follows that W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)
, for i ∈ N, is
uniformly integrable. Hence, taking limit with respect to i ∈ N on both sides of (69), we
then have
E
[
Uk
(
Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (T )
)
|Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
= E
[
W k,n
(
T, Xˆ
pi∗,nk
k (T ), L(T )
)
|Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
= lim
i→∞
E
[
W k,n
(
τi ∧ T, Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (τi ∧ T ), L(τi ∧ T )
)
|Xˆpi
∗,n
k
k (t) = x, L(t) = l
]
= W k,n (t, x, l) ,
establishing (15).
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